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Power systems will increasingly rely on synchrophasor systems for reliable and
high-performance wide area monitoring and control (WAMC). Synchrophasor systems
greatly use information communication technologies (ICT) for data exchange which are
vulnerable to cyber-attacks. Prior to installation of a synchrophasor system a set of cyber
security requirements must be developed and new devices must undergo vulnerability
testing to ensure that proper security controls are in place to protect the synchrophasor
system from unauthorized access. This dissertation describes vulnerability analysis and
testing performed on synchrophasor system components. Two network fuzzing
frameworks are proposed; for the IEEE C37.118 protocol and for an energy management
system (EMS).
While fixing the identified vulnerabilities in information infrastructures is
imperative to secure a power system, it is likely that successful intrusions will still occur.
The ability to detect intrusions is necessary to mitigate the negative effects from a
successful attacks. The emergence of synchrophasor systems provides real-time data with
millisecond precision which makes the observation of a sequence of fast events feasible.

Different power system scenarios present different patterns in the observed fast event
sequences. This dissertation proposes a data mining approach called mining common
paths to accurately extract patterns for power system scenarios including disturbances,
control and protection actions and cyber-attacks from synchrophasor data and logs of
system components. In this dissertation, such a pattern is called a common path, which is
represented as a sequence of critical system states in temporal order. The process of
automatically discovering common paths and building a state machine for detecting
power system scenarios and attacks is introduced. The classification results show that the
proposed approach can accurately detect these scenarios even with variation in fault
locations and load conditions.
This dissertation also describes a hybrid intrusion detection framework that
employs the mining common path algorithm to enable a systematic and automatic IDS
construction process. An IDS prototype was validated on a 2-line 3-bus power
transmission system protected by the distance protection scheme. The result shows the
IDS prototype accurately classifies 25 power system scenarios including disturbances,
normal control operations, and cyber-attacks.
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INTRODUCTION

1.1

Background
The need of electric market regulation and the connection of neighboring electric

grids motivate the use of wide area monitoring systems from which utilities have
improved visibility of the power grid. Many utilities in the United States of America
(USA) received grants from the Department of Energy (DOE) under the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) to create wide area monitoring systems. Wide
area monitoring systems are measurement systems that use information communication
technology (ICT) to transmit digital and/or analogue data measured by field sensors. The
wide area monitoring systems use synchrophasor technology to improve the visualization
and situational awareness through high quality measurements of voltage, current, and
frequency. The synchrophasor systems require installation of phasor measurement units
(PMU), and substation phasor data concentrators (PDC), among other devices and
software. PMUs and substation PDCs are networked appliances which use routable
network protocols to communicate. They are the key components in the synchrophasor
system and may become the target of cybersecurity attacks against bulk electric power
systems. Threats against these devices include denial of service attacks, attacks against
open ports and services intended to elevate privilege, attempts to change device settings,
attempts to inject malicious device commands, attempts to hijack device access
1

credentials or other confidential information, and attempts to place a man-in-the-middle
between devices.
Due to the critical role that the electric power systems play in our society, there is
a common agreement among different organizations that the electric power grid needs to
be better secured to ensure continuous power being provided to the nation [1]. The
ARRA grants required recipient entities to develop a cybersecurity plan which includes a
risk assessment as part of parent wide area monitoring systems projects. Also, the
synchrophasor devices, i.e. PMUs and PDCs, may be declared North American Electric
Reliability Corporation (NERC) Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) standard 002-3
[2] critical cyber assets (CCA), depending upon each individual unit’s application within
the electric power system. CCA must be housed within an electronic security perimeter
and undergo a cyber-vulnerability assessment. The National Institute of Standards and
Technology Interagency Report (NISTIR) 7628 also documents the guidelines and
requirements for industry to better secure their facilities [3].
While there is significant research in the vulnerability assessment of cybersecurity
for traditional Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, there are
comparatively few publicly known vulnerabilities for synchrophasor-based monitoring
and control systems. In addition, the tight integration of information communication
technology and the physical process poses new challenges to the synchrophasor-based
electric power system. For example, it has been shown that data delay and loss from a
communication system can cause serious interruption in control application of the electric
power system [15]. The United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) has
realized that current security guidelines from different organizations are not sufficient to
2

securely implement the future electricity grid that employs synchrophasor technology and
it calls for research and development to improve current security mechanisms [4].
1.2

Cyber-physical environment of power system
A typical power system is divided into four functional parts: generation,

transmission, distribution, and consumers. The electric transmission system is the
backbone of the power system transmitting the electric power from generators to the load
centers over a long distance. The structure of a cyber-physical environment for the electric
transmission system augmented with synchrophasor technology is shown in Figure 1.1.
The transmission system devices are mainly composed of transmission lines, breakers, and
transformers that are monitored by field sensors. In the case of a synchrophasor system
these field sensors are PMUs. The PMUs attached to transmission lines provide
synchronized data that is time-stamped using Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) for
continuous real-time monitoring. Phasor Data Concentrators (PDCs) collect synchrophasor
measurements from PMUs that are located in different locations and send the
measurements to the control center through the wide-area network (WAN). PMUs in
different locations and PDCs are key components in the synchrophasor based wide area
monitoring system (WAMS). Compared to the traditional SCADA system where the field
sensors measure the system once per several seconds, the emergence of WAMS leveraging
synchrophasor technology allows much faster measuring for the transmission system at the
rates ranging from 30 samples per second to 120 samples per second [8]. Nowadays,
synchrophasor measurements are not the only time-synchronized data in a system shown
in Figure 1.1. As more devices and power system components such as relays, breakers etc.
are integrated with the capability to synchronize to UTC, the status and measurements from
3

these devices are also time stamped and can be sent back to control center in real time [11].
The redundant information contributed by the time-synchronized data provides benefits for
reliability, efficiency, and economics in power system monitoring and control. The extreme
low latency offered by time-synchronized data allows various real-time wide area control
algorithms and special protection schemes to be used to increase power grid reliability and
stability [9][11][12][13][14]. The information flow described above is shown as the dotted
line in Figure 1.1 and is often recognized as a control loop. In the case of a distributed
control, the protection components in the system sense the disturbance and react to it by
themselves. The bi-directed-arrow lines in between control components and WAN
indicates not only the command data sent from control center but also the timesynchronized audit information reported from intelligent electronic devices (IDEs) to the
control center.

Control Center

WAN

Control Loop

Control
Components

Figure 1.1

Transmission
Devices

PMUs

PDC

Structure of electric transmission system with integration of synchrophasor
technology
4

The system can be considered as a finite state machine. If, for example, a tripping
operation is sent from control center, this will cause system state transitions because a
signal-sending operation has been recorded in the control panel which is one component
of the system. In general, the changes of the behaviors in different system components such
as a breaker, relay, and transmission lines in a given period of time or at a definite point of
time will cause the system state to transition from one state to another. These changes are
reflected by the transmission line sensor readings or device logs. If the system state is
represented as a set of observations (from logs of different components) and measurement
data (from measurement devices) inside the system, such changes along with time can be
regarded as temporal state transitions.
1.3

Cybersecurity challenges in synchrophasor-based power system
The electric power system in the past was often isolated and used proprietary

devices and software. However, the synchrophasor system greatly relies on the
commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) components e.g. hardware (e.g. Personal Computers
(PCs), network appliances, database servers), Windows Operating System, and
standardized IP-based industrial protocols such as IEC 61850 and IEEE C37.118. The
commercial hardware and software are usually the popular targets of cyber-attacks. There
are a large number of exploits available in an exploit frameworks such as Metaspoit [64].
It is proved that power systems are vulnerable to cyber attacks [80]. Most industrial
protocols use open standards without security features. In addition, there are still a large
number of legacy devices in the field that do not have security control mechanisms at all.
As such, the power system may be subjected to cyber-attacks. Potential catastrophic
consequences have been learned from Aurora [65] and Stuxnet [7] attacks where
5

attackers penetrated the network, gained access to the control software and altered system
states to destabilize the control systems. As a key componet in a cyber-physcial power
system, research should be conducted to determine the the adequency of cybersecurity
efforts in synchrophasor system.
Developing robust cyber infrastructure requires intrusion prevention. Intrusion
prevention techniques developed from penetration testing can fix the security breaches
and effectively prevent known attacks. However, failures in intrusion prevention are still
likely to occur, which can result in a compromise in the cyber infrastructure. A failure in
intrusion prevention may be exploited by, for example, a zero-day attack that is unknown
to the intrusion prevention mechenism. While successful attacks are always possible,
intrusion detection as a means for defense in depth is necessary to be deployed to detect
them. Intrusion detection system is helpful in reducing the negative impact in that fast
responses to stop the attack can be taken as soon as the attack is identified. Traditional
signature-based intrusion detection systems e.g. Snort are helpful to detect malicious
activities when a malicious network packet is found. However, due to the increasing
interaction between cyber infrastructure and the physical infrastructure created by the
emergence of high-speed networks in electric power system attacks against future power
systems will not be limited to those of the traditional IT system. Therefore traditional
intrusion detection systems may not be enough to protect the future power grid from
cyber-attacks that aim to interrupt physical processes. An example of such attacks is
resonance attacks in which an attacker who has compromised system sensors or
controllers causes the physical system to oscillate at its resonant frequency [5]. Another
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example is demonstrated in [6] where an attack can inject false data to compromise
meters to bypass the existing bad data detection algorithms.
1.4

Objectives
Over 1,000 PMU have been installed across North America, and many local and

regional phasor data concentrators collect real-time, high-speed, time-synchronized
information about power grid conditions to enhance grid operations and protect grid
reliability. This information is also shared between transmission and power plant owners
and grid operators to improve wide-area visualization of power grid states across large
regions and to enhance situational awareness. Such information also enables advanced
monitoring and control algorithms and new types of intrusion detection system that
leverage the system state information to detect malicious system behaviors.
Despite the benefits that synchrophasor systems bring to the power grid, they
exist threats of cyber-attacks as synchrophasor devices are highly interconnected using
information and communications technology (ICT). Synchrophasor devices are becoming
more attractive to attackers. First they usually directly interact with the physical power
system as they are installed in substations and measure transmission line parameters
including current, voltage, and frequency. Synchrophasor device unavailability will cause
the grid operators and plant owners to lose the view of power system conditions. Second,
as more synchrophasor devices are integrated with protection relays, compromise of these
devices may also result in attackers controlling breakers, which can lead to blackouts.
One objective of this work is to develop a methodology to identify vulnerabilities
associated with synchrophasor devices. This methodology will also identify gaps between
available security features of synchrophasor devices and the cyber security standards or
7

requirements. This work demonstrates that a testing process and tools can be developed
to conduct the vulnerability assessment for synchrophasor devices and protocols. One
significant problem related to vulnerability testing for synchrophasor devices is the lack
of protocol fuzzing tools available for mutating the IEEE C37.118 protocol. Also,
current commercial protocol mutation tools are limited to mutating server to client
commands and cannot mutate server to client responses. This makes commercial tools
unsuitable to test the IEEE C37.118 protocol. This work demonstrates a network fuzzing
framework developed to mutate IEEE C37.118 protocol packets and useful protocol
mutation of other protocols used by synchrophasor devices.
While identifying and closing synchrophasor system cyber vulnerabilities is
imperative, successful intrusions can still occur. Time-stamped data synchrophasor
measurements and device log provide cyber security researchers a new way to enable
intrusion detection. This leads to a research problem of developing unique signatures for
power system scenarios (i.e. disturbances) and cyber-attacks from the large amounts of
data available in a synchrophasor system. Due to power system and measurement system
dynamics, events present in the data have timestamp variation which makes mining
patterns difficult. A number of publications (See Chapter II) discuss using machine
learning methods to learn patterns for power system disturbances or cyber attacks but
none of the methods described in literature can be applied to mine patterns of both types.
Traditional data mining algorithms are designed to work on a small amount of data and
cannot easily be used to classify specific power system scenarios and cyber attacks [28].
Therefore, in this dissertation we describe a new data mining method called mining
common paths which learns unique signatures for different power system scenarios and
8

cyber attacks in terms of common paths from massive heterogeneous data collected from
a power system. We prove the correctness and usability of common paths by creating
patterns and classifying different power system disturbances and cyber attacks on one
transmission line.
Various research has been conducted to create intrusion detection systems (IDS)
for smart grid, however, proposed methods suffer from different shortcomings. For
example, host-based IDS is only able to monitor one location of the system. Networkbased IDS only focuses on network activities. Rule and specification-based IDS suffer
from limited scalability due to labor-intensive IDS creation and update procedures. One
objective of this dissertation is to create a new type of IDS that overcomes able to
monitor a fusion of data from heterogeneous power system sensors to classify actions or
scenarios which have recently occurred. The mining common paths algorithm was
applied to train an intrusion detection system for a power system of 3 buses and 2
transmission lines. The IDS was capable of classifying 25 separate disturbance, control,
and cyber-attack scenarios. This work proves that an IDS trained using the mining
common paths algorithm can monitor a power system implementing the distance
protection scheme. This work also shows that the mining common paths algorithm can
automatically learn patterns for a variety of cyber attacks, power system disturbances and
valid control actions from huge amount of data with little human interaction. Finally, this
work demonstrates the intrusion detection system is able to accurately classify each
scenario type with relatively small training and classification time and small memory
usage.

9

1.5

Contributions
This dissertation makes three primary contributions to industry and academia.

First, this dissertation presents a vulnerability testing process for PMU, PDC, and energy
management systems (EMS) which was successfully used to identify vulnerabilities in a
commercial synchrophasor system. The vulnerability testing includes a new fuzzing
framework for the IEEE C37.118 protocol and the EMS. The testing process has been
performed on PMU, PDC, and EMS from a major commercial hardware provider and a
major power system software provider. Various vulnerabilities have been identified and
reported to utilities and vendors. Suggestions on how to mitigate the security risk and to
improve the security features of synchrophasor devices were also provided based on
discovered vulnerabilities.
Second, this dissertation documents a data mining approach called mining
common path algorithm which accurately mines patterns from power system scenarios
including disturbances, valid control actions, and cyber-attacks from synchrophasor data
and logs of system components. These patterns, also known as common paths, represent
system behaviors unique to each scenario and can be used to classify each scenario. The
data mining algorithm is based on the mining sequential patterns algorithm which was
found in the human health diagnosis research domain to learn patient’s physiological
states. One contribution of this work is that we applied this data mining method to mine
patterns for power system scenarios and cyber attacks. However, this algorithm requires
that massive data to be preprocessed into a specific form called paths. To overcome this
obstacle, another contribution of this work was development of a method to preprocess
synchrophasor and power system state data into a set of paths usable by the algorithm.
10

Paths retain all events which have occurred in the system in a compressed form. As such
the data can be processed by the mining common paths algorithm. Compared to other
traditional data mining algorithms in [28], the classifier trained using mining common
paths algorithm is able to provide more precise classification which enables automated
controllers such as autonomic control frameworks in [66].
Finally, this dissertation also developed a hybrid intrusion detection system,
trained using the mining common paths algorithm, to detect a variety of power system
scenarios and cyber attacks in a large power system. The capability of the resulting IDS
to classify the specific power scenarios and cyber attacks advances IDS state-of-art . The
resulting IDS also complements current IDS techniques for Smart Grid by satisfying the
following requirements.
Requirement 1, the IDS should perform stateful monitoring at the system level.
This means the IDS should be able to provide monitoring at different locations of the
system to be able to monitor ordered sequences of execution events. Requirement 2, the
IDS must be able to monitor actions of an automated control algorithm. It should be able
to distinguish actions which originate from a system operator or automated control
algorithm from similar actions which originate from an attacker where the primary
distinguishing feature is the state of the system when the action occurs. Namely, we
expect the new IDS to be able to detect not only cyber-attacks, but also power system
disturbances and normal operations. For this work, the IDS must be able to monitor a
system implementing the distance protection scheme for normal and attack behaviors.
Requirement 3, the IDS must be able to detect zero day attacks, i.e. attacks that are
unknown to the IDS. Requirement 4, the IDS should be able to process high volumes of
11

data from multiple sensors. Requirement 5, the IDS must be low cost. Cost includes
development time and compute resources required to implement the IDS. This
requirement also includes that the IDS should be able to extend to new scenarios as they
are detected. Requirement 6, the IDS must be scalable to larger and more complex control
algorithms. This requirement is intended to address the dynamic nature of the power
system. The IDS must be able to continue to correctly classify behaviors as system
configuration and load change. The IDS must be able to detect events that occur in
random order. Requirement 7, the IDS must have high accuracy and minimal false
positives.

12

CHAPTER II
RELATED WORKS

2.1

Current research in power system vulnerability assessment
The National SCADA Test Bed Program run by the Idaho National Lab (INL)

built a large scale SCADA test bed for the purpose of assessing control system
cybersecurity, improving and extending the cybersecurity standards as well as training.
Various common vulnerabilities associated with SCADA systems are reported in [9]
from the program. Findings and learned lessons are summarized in [16] from security
assessment of control systems. The program also develops recommended procurement
language to enhance and improve the security in wireless systems for advanced metering
infrastructure [17]. In addition, INL is engaged in cyber security standard improvement,
training and cyber security assessment of software and hardware products for power
system industry. However, no result is reported from INL regarding to cyber security
assessment for synchrophasor system.
Researchers have performed vulnerability assessments of generation and
substation devices to support development of taxonomies of vulnerabilities related to
industrial control systems. In [18] Fovino et al. describe a test bed used for vulnerability
assessment of components found in a Turbo-Gas Power Plant.
In [19] Skaggs et al. describe a tool, NETGLEAN, testing device for network
vulnerabilities. Two well-known tools are available for network vulnerability testing of
13

industrial control systems. Wurldtech [20] offers the Achilles Satellite product for testing
industrial control system devices. MU Dynamics [21] offers the MU Test Suite for
testing networked devices, include industrial control system devices. Both products
include protocol mutation and denial of service test suites.
2.2

Current research in data mining techniques in application to event detection
for power system
Compared to peer works, this work is unique in that we propose a data mining

algorithm that can learn patterns for both power system disturbances and cyber-attacks
from heterogeneous data including synchrophasor measurements and device logs from
multiple locations in the power system. Multiple traditional data mining algorithms were
used to classify power system faults and cyber-attacks in [28]. The traditional data
mining algorithms were able to differentiate between three broad categories with
approximately 70% accuracy, power system disturbance, control action, and cyber-attack,
however, the traditional data mining algorithms were not able to classify specific fault
and cyber-attack types within each large category.
Current research on applying data mining to synchrophasor data for power system
fault and disturbance classification can be found in [68] and [69]. These works limit
algorithm input to synchrophasor measurements and do not provide cyber-attack
detection. The K-nearest neighbor algorithm was used to classify three phase faults
(3LG), voltage oscillation, and voltage sag scenarios in [68]. The algorithm accuracy is
not provided in [68]. Stream data mining is used in [69]. This approach was able to
classify 3LG and single line to ground (1LG) faults grouped for binary classification with
greater than 90% accuracy. Both [68] and [69] used simulated power system data.
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Many other data mining approaches have been developed to extract signatures
and classify power system disturbances but they have no ability to detect cyber-attacks.
Many such approaches classify power system disturbances in the time domain. Decision
trees were used to classify power system disturbances in [22] and [23]. Statistical
characteristics of power system frequency were used in [24] to represent the signatures of
power system disturbances. Frequency domain analysis has been proposed to avoid
complex transient phenomena in time-domain waveforms. The frequency domain
approaches first convert time-domain waveforms to the frequency domain using wavelet
or/and Fourier transforms and then extract oscillation related features. Both Support
Vector Machines (SVM) [25] and artificial neural networks (ANN) [26] have been used
to classify of disturbances in the frequency domain. Many works have applied neural
networks to classify faults. Using current and voltage data as input, patterns for faults can
be learned by radial basis function neural networks [72], Kohonen neural networks [74]
and self-organizing map-based neural networks [73]. In [75] the authors used a neural
network with current waveforms and data from digital fault recorders to classify faults,
normal maintenance operations, and power-quality disturbances. The work presented in
this work uses a sequential data mining approach to classify patterns from sequences of
events. Sequential data mining is better suited for high velocity and high volume
synchrophasor data streams because synchrophasor data is discrete data but continuous in
time. Additionally, the mining common paths algorithm presented in this work can learn
to classify traditional power system contingencies, such as faults, and cyber-attacks
against power systems which masquerade as traditional contingencies.
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Machine learning approaches have also been applied to detect cyber-attacks
against power systems. In [27], detection rules were derived by manually specifying
allowable ranges for different system measurements using domain expert knowledge.
Such specification based methods have been shown to have high detection accuracy;
however, the manual effort required to develop such a decision tree is too great to apply
to a problem on the scale of power system protection. Traditional machine learning
algorithms were applied to a dataset which captured power system disturbances, control
actions, and cyber-attacks [28]. The machine learning algorithms were able to
successfully differentiate between grouped power system disturbances, control actions,
and cyber-attacks, but, were not able to classify specific events in each larger category.
Additionally, the machine learning algorithms make a classification decision for each row
of the data set, which, was sampled at a rate of 120 measurements per second.
Providing a classification at each row of the dataset rate amplifies the total number of
false positives. The IDS presented in this dissertation provides a classification at once
per detected scenario which results in one classification per several thousand rows of the
dataset minimizing the volume of false positives.
Other works have been found which provide intrusion detection for
synchrophasor systems. An IDS was proposed which uses white lists to detect invalid
network behaviors based on a synchrophasor network protocol specification [29]. A
second proposed IDS uses timing and data volume information to identify data integrity
attacks against synchrophasor systems [30]. To the best of authors’ knowledge no
research has been published which detects both power system disturbances and cyberattacks at the same time.
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The data mining technique used in this dissertation uses “mining sequential
patterns” technique which discovers patterns of activity sequences from time ordered
data. The “mining sequential patterns” algorithm was first mentioned in [31]. It was used
to discover patterns in clinical client care management process data that consists of
patient records and log data over a period of treatment time [32]. This technique was
extended in [33] by employing a two dimension Bayesian network to graphically
represent patterns in Hemodialysis processes which consist of a sequence of medical
activities over time. In order to discover patterns, a patients’ physiological “state” is
defined using clinical log data and patient records (e.g. body temperature). The pattern is
therefore, represented as contiguous transitions of states in a two dimension graph. The
classification was made using the patterns.
For this work, the FP-growth algorithm is used to mine frequent sequential
patterns. FP-Growth reduces the cost of searching for frequent sequences by adopting a
divide-and-conquer strategy [34]. As demonstrated in [70], FP-graph algorithm
outperforms several popular frequent pattern mining algorithms in run time and therefore
it was chosen for this work.
2.3
2.3.1

Current research in intrusion detection system for smart grid
Intrusion detection system (IDS) for smart grid
In recent years, the emergence of the smart grid has motivated research into a

variety of IDS techniques. People with different backgrounds have created various IDS
that focus on different aspects of the smart grid. One type of IDS research focuses on
intelligent electronic device (IED) security within the smart grid. For example, CheeWooi Ten et al. developed an anomaly-based detection technique to detect attacks against
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IED [35]. The Chee-Wooi Ten IDS is host-based thus only identifies attacks against a
single IED in the substation using sequential events recorded in the log from that IED.
Another IDS proposed by Chen et al. provides a protection mechanism for smart
household appliances [36]. Chen et al. created security rules for individual appliances by
proposing homogeneous functions that models three factors of the appliance: device
security, usability and electricity pricing. While these two IDS secure individual devices
in the smart grid, they do not provide stateful monitoring at system level for the smart
grid. More advanced IDS of this type consider behaviors of multiple devices within the
system to obtain system level detection. In [27], Mitchell et al. propose a rule-based IDS
for the electric grid by considering the behaviors of three types of physical devices in the
electric grid: head-ends, distribution access points/data aggregation points, and subscriber
energy meters. Mitchell et al. use readings from 22 sensors from the three types of
devices as state components. By quantizing each of the 22 components into a limited
number of ranges, they manually build three state machines with 3456, 1728, and 3456
states for the three devices respectively in terms of conjunctive normal form. To
manually build such an IDS is very expensive due to the large state space. Additionally,
this IDS uses a limited number of sensors therefore is able to detect a limited number of
attacks. Since there are always new attacks and applications, this method is not scalable.
Network based IDS leverage communication traffic in the information
infrastructure of smart grid to detect cyber-attacks. Yang et al. propose an IDS for
synchrophasor systems that detects cyber-attacks by using access control white lists,
protocol-based white lists and network behavior-based rules, each of which specify
security rules in different layers of the synchrophasor system [29]. The Yang et al. IDS is
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limited to cyber-attacks including MITM and DoS against synchrophasor devices and
IEEE C37.118 protocol. Similar to Yang’s IDS, Zhang et al. propose a distributed IDS
that analyzes communications traffic at different network levels of smart grid including
home area networks, neighborhood area networks, and wide area networks [37]. An
intelligent module is deployed at each level to classify malicious data and possible cyberattacks using data mining algorithms. These modules then communicate to get a system
level view of the status of the whole communication network to improve the detection
accuracy. Hadeli et al., in [38], propose an anomaly detection technique for industrial
control systems that extracts behavior patterns of devices from protocols used in
industrial control systems, for example, GOOSE messages, IEEE 61850, Manufacturing
Message Specification, Modbus/TCP and redundant network routing protocols. The
Hadeli IDS uses a system description file to provide a full description of the overall
communication pattern in the industrial control system. For the case of power system
control applications, the system description file describes expected system behaviors
from information carried by those protocols. Hadeli’s method, along with [29] and [37]
are efficient to detect malicious activities that cause changes in network traffic, but the
IDS fails to detect malicious actions that result in invalid changes to the physical system.
For example, Hadeli’s method cannot detect a malicious command to trip a protection
relay from a valid IP address which will take a transmission line out of service and cause
a blackout. A specification-based IDS that can track sequential events of the system is
reported in [39] for the advanced metering infrastructure (AMI). The authors manually
built a state machine by extracting specifications from two AMI protocols and devices
status. To prove the correctness of the state machine, a model checking technique was
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used to verify the specifications. This IDS is also not applicable to transmission systems
because transmission systems have far more control actions and disturbances than AMI.
As such, manually building a state machine would be very expensive.
Other proposed IDS for smart grid leverage power system theory. For instance, in
[40], Valenzuela et al. use optimal power flow programs to detect cyber-attacks which
alter system measurement data as the bad data will cause the power flow to be dispatched
erroneously. Talebi et al. propose a mechanism for identification of bad data attacks in a
power system using weighted state estimation [41]. Zonouz et al. proposed an IDS that
not only examines the measurement data using state estimation and power flow theory
but also includes the results from network IDS to calculate the probability that the data is
compromised [42]. Although these works are all proven capable of detecting altered data,
these IDS are limited to one type of attack and cannot be extended to detect other attacks
against power systems.
2.3.2

Accuracy of specification-based IDS
The detection accuracy of specification-based IDS depends on how accurately the

specifications describe system behaviors. Different efforts have been made to build
accurate specifications for specification-based IDS. One approach is to use a formal
language, such as the declarative language MuSigs [44] to describe known attacks using
temporal logic formulas [45]. The MuSigs authors formally specified attack signatures
and proved the soundness and completeness of their detection rules. The use of a formal
language to specify behaviors is too work intensive for a power system IDS where there
are too many behaviors to specify.
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A promising way to improve the accuracy of specifications is through the use of
data mining. A data mining technique was applied to an IDS framework proposed by Lee
et al. that combined signature-based IDS and anomaly-based IDS [43]. Data mining
programs were applied to a large volume of log data to learn attack signatures and normal
behavior patterns and automatically create detection rules. Lee et al. showed that the
signatures for attacks and patterns for system normal behaviors created using their data
mining technique are accurate by comparing their results for probing and user to root
privilege escalation attacks to all other participants in the DARPA intrusion detection
evaluation program prepared by MIT Lincoln Labs. The overall detection accuracy of
their IDS against 4 types of attacks is 80.2% and is the highest among all participants.
Lee’s IDS was originally designed for stateless IDS therefore it cannot be directly applied
to specification-based IDS. A new data mining algorithm must be developed to discover
sequential events for specifications.
2.3.3

Data mining techniques for learning specifications
A specification for a scenario contains a sequence of execution events or system

states. The nature of specifications requires the data mining technique applied to the
proposed IDS to be able to mine sequential patterns and identify the dependent
relationship between events. The data mining technique used in this dissertation uses the
“mining sequential patterns” technique which discovers patterns of activity from time
ordered data. The “mining sequential patterns” algorithm was first mentioned in [31]. Lin
et al. applied it to discover patterns in clinical client care management process data that
consists of patient records and log data over a period of treatment time [32]. This
technique was extended in [33] by employing a two dimension Bayesian network to
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graphically represent patterns in Hemodialysis processes which consist of a sequence of
medical activities over time. In order to discover patterns, a patients’ physiological
“state” is defined using clinical log data and patient records (e.g. body temperature). The
pattern is therefore, represented as contiguous transitions of states in a 2-dimention graph.
The classification was made using the patterns.
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CHAPTER III
CYBERSECURITY TESTING FOR SYNCHROPHASOR SYSTEM

3.1

Introduction
Many utilities in the United States of America received grants from the

Department of Energy under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) to
create wide area monitoring systems. The ARRA grants require recipient entities to
develop a cybersecurity plan which includes a risk assessment as part of parent wide area
monitoring systems projects. Wide area monitoring systems require installation of phasor
measurement units (PMU), and substation phasor data concentrators (PDC), among other
devices and software. PMUs and substation PDCs are networked appliances which use
routable protocols. As such, these devices may be declared North American Electric
Reliability Corporation (NERC) Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) standard 002-3
[2] critical cyber assets (CCA), depending upon each individual unit’s application within
the power system. CCA must be housed within an electronic security perimeter and
undergo a cyber vulnerability assessment.
The IEEE 1402 Guide for Electric Power Substation Physical and Electronic
Security [2] defines cyber intrusion or electronic intrusion as “Entry into the substation
via telephone lines or other electronic-based media for the manipulation or disturbance of
electronic devices.” PMU and substation PDC are networked appliances and may
become the target of attacks against bulk electric power systems. Threats against these
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devices include denial of service attacks, attacks against open ports and services intended
to elevate privilege, attempts to change device settings, attempts to inject malicious
device commands, attempts to hijack device access credentials or other confidential
information, and attempts to place a man-in-the-middle between devices.
This chapter describes the process used to develop a set of cyber security
requirements for PMU and PDC installation. Three primary sources were used to derive
cyber security requirements. First, NISTIR 7628: Guidelines for Smart Grid Cyber
Security [3] was reviewed and 28 relevant requirements were taken from this document.
Second, the Department of Homeland Security: Cyber Security Procurement Language
for Control Systems was reviewed. This document was used to derive project
requirements and used as a basis for procurement language added to vendor contracts.
Second, this dissertation describes testing performed to identify PMU and PDC
vulnerabilities prior to device installation in a production control system. A MU
Dynamics MU-4000 Analyzer was used to perform network congestion testing, denial of
service testing, and protocol mutation testing. Testing also included device manual
reviews to identify security related features, security feature testing, network traffic
disclosure testing, and subjecting of devices to network isolation via introduction of
extraneous VLAN, and a man-in-the-middle attack. Results from the tests were provided
to the utility to enable network monitoring to mitigate identified vulnerabilities and to
allow the utility to work device vendors to create corrective action plans. PMUs and
PDCs from multiple vendors were tested. Vendor names and product identifiers are
withheld from this article to prevent enabling attacks. Results from this testing have been
shared with device vendors. Finally, this dissertation describes a methodology for
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developing signature based intrusion detection system developed for us in bulk electric
substations. The intrusion detection system described take information from multiple
sources including, SNORT, synchrophasor data, relay data logs, and energy management
system logs to provide model based classification of system occurrences as valid faults or
network based attacks.
The body of this chapter includes a section describing synchrophasor system
cyber security requirements development, a section describing cyber security testing of
synchrophasor system components, a section describing development of Snort rules, and
finally, a section on future works and conclusions.
3.2

Synchrophasor system cyber security requirements development
Prior to testing a set of cybersecurity requirements and recommendations were

prepared from review of the National Institute of Standards and Technology Interagency
Report (NISTIR) 7628 Guidelines for Smart Grid Cyber Security: Vol. 2, Security
Architecture and Security Requirements [3], Department of Homeland Security (DHS):
Cyber Security Procurement Language for Control Systems [46], and utility internal
requirements. NISTIR 7628 Vol. 2 includes a process for deriving cyber security
recommendations and requirements for smart grid systems. NISTIR 7628 requirements
and recommendations are taken from NIST SP 800-53 Revision 3 [47], the Department
of Homeland Security Catalog of Control Systems Security: Recommendations for
Standards Developers [48], NERC CIP (1-9) [2]. Each requirement is traceable to one or
more of the aforementioned source documents.
A cross functional team was formed to review and discuss cyber security
requirements and recommendations. This team included representatives from the utility,
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the vendor of phasor measurement unit and phasor data concentrator hardware, the
vendor of the energy management system, bulk electric transmission system consultants,
and a cyber security researcher from academia. Team members included cyber security
engineers, power system engineers, network communications engineers, hardware and
software designers, and management representatives. A subcommittee drafted an initial
version of cyber security recommendations and requirements for the intended
synchrophasor system. The initial draft was circulated to the larger team for review.
Finally, multiple meetings were held with all team members to discuss each proposed
cyber security requirement in detail. The resulting recommendations and requirements
are included in Table 3.1 and Table 3.2. Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 list requirements
pertinent to system hardware and software components.
Requirements related to organization and management, physical protections,
services acquisition, macro information system protection, risk management and
assessment, personnel security, planning, maintenance, incident response, information
and document management, configuration management, training, and security program
management exist but are not listed in Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 [83].
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Table 3.1

Recommendations and Requirements Derived from NISTIR 7628 [3]

NISTIR 7628

Title

Description

Access

The synchrophasor system should enforce

Enforcement

assigned authorizations for controlling access.

Least Privilege

The synchrophasor system should assign and

Req. #
AC-4

AC-7

enforce the most restrictive set of rights and
privileges or access needed by users for the
performance of specified tasks.
AC-8

Unsuccessful

The synchrophasor system should enforce a

Login Attempts

defined number of consecutive invalid login
attempts by a user during a defined time
period.

AC-9

Smart Grid

The synchrophasor system should display

Information

appropriate use banners where applicable.

System Use
Notification
AC-10

Previous Logon

The synchrophasor system should notify the

Notification

user, upon successful logon, of the date and
time of the last logon and the number of
unsuccessful logon attempts since the last
successful logon.
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Table 3.1 (Continued)
NISTIR 7628

Title

Description

Session Lock

The synchrophasor system should initiate a

Req. #
AC-12

session lock after an organization-defined time
period of inactivity or upon receiving a request
from a user; and retain the session lock until
the user reestablishes access.
AC-21

Passwords

The synchrophasor system should adhere to
utility password complexity rules and
passwords should be changed according to
utility policy.

AU-2

Auditable Events

A set of auditable events should be developed
for the synchrophasor system. The list should
be revised based on current threat data,
assessment of risk, and post-incident analysis.
of risk, and post-incident analysis.

AU-3

AU-8

Content of Audit

The synchrophasor system should produce

Records

audit records for each auditable event.

Time Stamps

The synchrophasor system should use internal
system clocks to generate time stamps for audit
records.
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Table 3.1 (Continued)
NISTIR 7628

Title

Description

Req. #
AU-9

Protection of Audit The synchrophasor system should protect audit
Information

information and audit tools from unauthorized
access, modification, and deletion.

AU-10

AU-16

Audit Record

The synchrophasor system audit logs for a

Retention

utility specified time period.

Non-Repudiation

The synchrophasor system should protect
against an individual falsely denying having
performed a particular action.

CP-10

IA-5

Smart Grid

The utility must have the capability to recover

Information

and reconstitute the synchrophasor system to a

System Recovery

known secure state after a disruption,

and Reconstitution

compromise, or failure.

Device

The synchrophasor system should uniquely

Identification and

identify and authenticate devices before

Authentication

establishing a connection where technically
feasible.

SC-3

Security Function

The synchrophasor system should isolate

Isolation

security functions from non-security functions.
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Table 3.1 (Continued)
NISTIR 7628

Title

Description

Denial-of-Service

The synchrophasor system should mitigate or

Protection

limit the effects of denial-of-service attacks

Req. #
SC-5

based on an organization-defined list of denialof-service attacks.
SC-7

Boundary

The synchrophasor system should be

Protection

appropriately placed within electronic security
perimeters.

SC-8

Communication

The Smart Grid information system protects the

Integrity

integrity of electronically communicated
information.

SC-9

Communication

The synchrophasor system should protect the

Confidentiality

confidentiality of sensitive communicated
information.

SC-10

Trusted Path

The synchrophasor system should establish a
trusted communications path between the user
and the synchrophasor system.
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Table 3.1 (Continued)
NISTIR 7628

Title

Description

Use of Validated

All of the cryptography and other security

Cryptography

functions that are required shall be NIST

Req. #
SC-12

Federal Information Processing Standard
(FIPS) approved.
SC-19

Security Roles

Specific security roles and responsibilities for
users of the synchrophasor system should be
defined.

SC-20

Message

The synchrophasor system should provide

Authenticity

mechanisms to protect the authenticity of
device-to-device communications.

SC-22

Fail in Known

Devices and software used in synchrophasor

State

system should fail in a known state to prevent
loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability.

SC-26

Confidentiality of

Synchrophasor system hardware and software

Information at

should employ cryptographic mechanisms for

Rest

all critical security parameters to prevent
unauthorized disclosure of information at rest.
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Table 3.1 (Continued)
NISTIR 7628

Title

Description

Application

The synchrophasor system should separate user

Partitioning

functionality (including user interface services)

Req. #
SC-29

from management functionality.

NISTIR requirements address access control (AC), audit requirements (AU),
continuity of operations (CP), identification and authentication (IA), and smart grid
information system and communication protection (SC). The requirements were derived
using the NISTIR 7628 Logical Interface Category 3: Interface between control systems
and equipment with high availability, without compute or bandwidth constraints. This
interface category specifically includes communication interfaces between phasor
measurement units and a wide area measurement system. It was assumed that the
synchrophasor system would eventually be used to source measurements to wide area
protection system applications and therefore high availability was a requirement. It was
also assumed that new computer systems and new communication bandwidth would be
added to support the synchrophasor system and therefore not compute or bandwidth
constraints were assumed.
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Table 3.2

Recommendations and Requirements Derived from DHS Cyber Security
Procurement Language for Control Systems [46]

Req. #

Title

Description

PROC.1

System

Vendor(s) shall list required ports and services for

Hardening

normal and emergency operation.

Least Privilege

Vendor(s) shall configure systems with least

PROC.2

privilege file and account access and provide
documentation of the configuration.
PROC.3

PROC.4

PROC.5

PROC.6

Hardware

Vendor(s) shall disable all unneeded communication

Configuration

ports and removable media drives.

Upgrade

Vendor(s) shall password protect the BIOS from

Access Control

unauthorized changes.

Patch

Vendor(s) shall have a patch management and update

Management

process.

Perimeter

Vendor(s) shall provide detailed information on all

Protection

communications (including protocols) required
through a firewall.

PROC.7

PROC.8

Session

Vendor(s) shall not permit user credentials to be

Management

transmitted in clear text.

Concurrent

Vendor(s) shall not allow multiple concurrent logins,

Logins

applications to retain login information between
sessions, provide any auto-fill functionality during
login, or allow anonymous logins.
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Table 3.2 (Continued)
Req. #

Title

Description

PROC.9

Account

Vendor(s) shall provide user account-based logout

Logout and

and timeout settings.

Timeout
PROC.10

Warning

A standard warning banner developed by the utility

Banner

and must be displayed when users logon to a utility
computer system and/or network.

PROC.11

Least Privilege

System owners must restrict privileges for all users,
interconnected systems, and software based on the
principle of least privilege. Where possible, system
role accounts and programs must not run with
elevated privileges.

PROC.12

Configurable

Vendor(s) shall provide a configurable account

Password

password management system that allows for

Complexity

selection of password length, frequency of change,
setting of required password complexity, number of
login attempts, inactive session logout, screen lock by
application, and denial of repeated or recycled use of
the same password.
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Table 3.2 (Continued)
Req. #

Title

Description

PROC.13

Password

Vendor(s) shall not store passwords electronically or

storage

in vendor-supplied hardcopy documentation in clear
text unless the media is physically protected.

PROC.14

PROC.15

Emergency

Vendor(s) shall provide a mechanism for rollback of

Security

security authentication policies during emergency

Rollback

system recovery.

Password

Passwords must be encrypted using a utility approved

Encryption

cryptographic algorithm.

Algorithm
PROC.16

PROC.17

Password

User account passwords to utility defined complexity

Complexity

requirements.

Activity

Vendor(s) shall provide a system whereby account

Logging

activity is logged and is auditable both from a
management (policy) and operational (account use
activity) perspective.

PROC.18

Audit Log

Vendor(s) shall time stamp, encrypt, and control

Time Stamping

access to audit trails and log files where feasible.

and Encryption
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Table 3.2 (Continued)
Req. #

Title

Description

PROC.19

Audit Log

Vendor(s) shall ensure audit logging does not

Impact on

adversely impact system performance requirements.

System
Performance
PROC.20

Audit Log

Log data shall include the date and time of the event,

Entry Contents

the unique ID used to initiate the event, the type of
event, success or failure, and the name of the object
involved.

PROC.21

PROC.22

User Accounts

Vendor(s) shall provide for user accounts with

with Defined

configurable access and permissions associated with

Role

the defined user role.

TCP/IP

Vendor(s) shall provide physical and cyber security

Cybersecurity

features, including but not limited to authentication,

Features

encryption, access control, event and communication
logging, monitoring, and alarming to protect the
device and configuration computer from
unauthorized modification or use.

PROC.23

Approved

The use of cryptographic algorithms must be limited

Cryptographic

utility approved algorithms.

Algorithms
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3.3

Synchrophasor system cyber security component testing
The cyber security requirements from the above section were applied to hardware,

software, and communication systems throughout the synchrophasor system. A diagram
was developed which included all system components and communication interfaces to
each component. A sanitized version of the synchrophasor system component disgram is
shown in Figure 3.1. The energy management system components depicted in this figure
may not be complete but are necessary for adopting synchrophasor technology. This
work provides a third party testing methodologies for phasor measurement unit (PMU),
phasor data concentrator (PDC) and the energy management (EMS) system. The
following sections give the cybersecurity testing procedures and methodologies for PMU
and PDC. The testing results with vulnerabilities are ranked using a risk scale proprietary
to the utility who grant this work.

Figure 3.1

Synchrophasor system component diagram
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3.3.1

Testing environment configuration
Three PMUs and one PDC were tested. A MU Dynamics MU-4000 Analyzer was

used to perform denial of service, network congestion, and protocol mutation tests for
well-known protocols such as TCP/IP etc. A personal computer (PC) was used with
Wireshark to capture network traffic data logs and to host software used to configure and
remotely control the PMU and PDC. The PMUs were connected to a Real Time Digital
Simulator (RTDS) in a hardware-in-the-loop configuration. The RTDS provided
simulated high voltage AC busses for the PMU’s to measure. PMUs were connected
through a substation router to PDC. PDC concentrated synchrophasor measurement
streams from the PMU and forwarded this data to an OpenPDC installation which served
as a historian for the system. Noted that, there is another PC depicted as attacker’s, which
is used to perform penetration testing such as Man-in-the-middle attacks and IEEE
C37.118 protocol mutation tests. Figure 3.2 shows the test bed configuration.

Figure 3.2

Test bed configuration
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PMUs periodically measure voltage, current, and transmit voltage and current
phasors (based upon a reference cosine waveform) at 120 samples per second. PMUs are
time synchronized devices with clocks synchronized to Universal Time Coordinated
(UTC) with 1 microsecond accuracy. Synchrophasor network packets are transmitted
from the PMUs to a PDC. PMUs adhere to the IEEE C37.118 standard which specifies
measurement requirements and the synchrophasor measurement format. PMUs may
communicate over Ethernet or Serial port. Three PMU’s were tested for this work. PMU
A and PMU B shared the same vendor, while PMU C was manufactured by a second
vendor. All PMUs communicate over Ethernet using the IEEE C37.118 protocol. PDC
collect synchrophasor streams from multiple PMU and create a single stream for
retransmission to historian. PDC perform stream data rate conversion and can be
configured to interpolate when data is missing from a stream. PDC adhere to the IEEE
C37.118 standard and communicate over Ethernet.
3.4
3.4.1

Cybersecurity testing
Network congestion testing
The MU-4000 Network Analyzer was used to perform network congestion

testing. The MU-4000 denial of service test suite includes tests for multiple network
protocols across all network OSI layers. The denial of service tests validate a device’s
ability to withstand large volumes of traffic directed at the device. The relevant network
protocols for testing PMU and PDC include various types of protocols in different
ISO/OSI layers.
Each network congestion test attempts to stress a separate portion of the device’s
network stack. The tests target a device’s ability to process large volumes of a single type
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of network traffic. The PMUs and PDC are usually based on embedded systems or
simplified PC structure therefore contain limited memory which can be exhausted and
lead to operating system exceptions, cause services to stall, and or cause the device to
reset itself. A set of network layer tests send floods of ARP requests, PPPOE packets, and
IPv4 packets to the target device. Network layer variations send random packets of all
three types, IP packets with random sizes and random payload, and IP packets with large
numbers of IP fragments. A set of ICMP tests were also used. ICMP tests send floods of
ICMP echo requests (aka. Ping flood or Smurf attack), ICMP echo packets with large
payloads, address mask requests, and source quench messages.
Transport layer tests send floods of TCP and UDP packets to the device under
test. TCP tests include variations which stress a device’s ability to create and teardown
TCP sessions with floods of TCP SYN and TCP FIN packets targeting individual TCP
ports and to random TCP ports. UDP tests include random headers and payloads to the
UDP ports which are open in the target devices.
Two tests validate device behavior for illegal packet types. A LAND test sends
floods of IP packets with both the source and destination IP address set to the target’s IP
address. A teardrop test sends fragmented IP packets which have overlapping IP
fragments.
All devices tested eventually became unresponsive when the traffic volume
increases beyond that devices ability to process packets. Figure 3.3 shows typical device
behavior to denial of service tests. The brown triangle shows the rate packets are being
transmitted to the target device. As the tester ramps the packet rate it periodically sends
the target an instrumentation packet (a query which the tested device is known to support)
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to test if the device is able to respond. The instrumentation packet may be a TCP session
request on a supported port or an ICMP echo request or any other type of packet the
target is known to be capable of responding to. The blue vertical lines show the target
device responding to instrumentation requests. A taller blue line indicates a slower
response time. The red dots indicate failed instrumentation request. As the packet rate
increases devices become unresponsive. Some devices may hang or reset themselves
when subjected to high packet rates. Many devices are unresponsive during the test, but,
become responsive again when the packet rate returns to acceptable levels.

Figure 3.3

Denial of service test response time chart

Understanding the packet rate which causes a device to become unresponsive is
important for system planning and for creating an effective denial of service mitigation
approach. Figure 3.4 shows a typical availability chart for a single denial of service test
against a device. The availability shows the percent availability (Y-axis), percentage of
time that a device is able to respond to instrumentation requests, versus packet
transmission rate (X-axis).
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The availability chart can be used by utility engineers and network administrators
to define a maximum threshold for traffic congestion at the switch or router within the
substation for the different traffic types. Based upon testing results it is recommended
that utilities monitor network traffic volume in control system networks to detect
transmission of high volumes of traffic. Monitoring systems should alert a human
administrator to enable mitigation. Routers in the control system network may be
configured to limit traffic sent to the PMU or PDC or may be configured to close ports
sourcing offensive amounts of network traffic. Automatically closing router ports is
potentially dangerous since critical traffic may use the port. A thorough system review
should be performed before enabling automatic port closure. Maximum traffic rate
thresholds should be defined for all relevant traffic types.

Figure 3.4

Availability chart from congestion testing

It is important to understand PMU and PDC behavior after DOS event completes.
Testers should confirm that tested devices and network appliances in the route do not
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queue large volume of IEEE C37.118 data packets which then leads to a synchrophasor
stream which is perpetually delayed. PDC hold data from on time PMU to wait for data
packets from late arriving PMU streams. A denial of service attack can have a persistent
effect if the attacked PMU’s date stream becomes consistently late after the attack. PDC
eventually drop old data packets and begin to interpolate. PMU and PDC which recover
from a denial of service attack should clear their transmit queues to avoid the
aforementioned effects.
3.4.2

Protocol mutations
A second method to test for denial of service vulnerabilities is through protocol

mutation, also known as protocol fuzzing. Fuzzing is a general term for a type of
software testing technology that uses unexpected input and monitors for exceptions for
discovering faults in software. The results of fuzzing can help to ensure that exceptions
can be handled appropriately, filter out unwanted values while allowing the full range of
acceptable inputs [49]. In the rest of this chapter, it is abbreviated as fuzzing. The
program that performs fuzzing work is called fuzzer. Two types of protocol mutation
methods are used in this work. One is brute force fuzzing that creates network packets
with random changes [49]. The fuzzer that implements brute force fuzzing starts from a
valid sample of a protocol or data format and keeps mangling every individual bit or byte
or word within the data packet. This type of fuzzing is pretty straightforward because all
it needs to do is to modify the data and pass it along to the target. It requires little
research to the format of the data massage and therefore it is also called “dumb fuzzing”.
The other type of fuzzing is through manually modifying protocol packets
according to how the protocol specification works and therefore it is relatively “smart”.
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This type of fuzzing is called “smart fuzzing” in this work. In smart fuzzing each field in
a mutated packet’s header, payload, and trailer is assigned a set of variant values that are
designed specifically for the target. The selection of protocols for mutation testing was
based on port scanning and device manual review results. Variant values for a field may
include legal values and illegal values. The protocol mutation tester creates a set of
packets which include all combinations of all fields with all variant values. The number
of combinations grows quickly and protocol mutation can be a slow process. However,
the benefit of protocol mutation, no matter dumb or smart is that combinations of packet
fields which may not be thought of by a human can be tested to confirm that the device
network stack does not hang or reset when the test packet is processed. Protocol mutation
is intended to discover vulnerabilities before they are discovered by an adversary and
become exploited zero day vulnerabilities.
All communication protocols supported by a device are tested. Mutated protocols
for the PMU and PDCs included ARP, TCP, UDP, IP, ICMP, DNP3, MODBUS, IEEE
C37.118, and HTTP. The protocol mutation testing of these protocols are done using the
MU 4000 Network analyzer except IEEE C37.118 where a fuzzing framework is
developed.
3.4.2.1

MU-4000 network analyzer
The MU-4000 Network Analyzer was used to perform protocol mutation testing.

As with the denial of service testing the tester sends groups of mutated packets to the
target device. The tester periodically sends instrumentation packets (queries which the
tested device is known to support) to confirm that the device under test can still respond.
Protocol mutation requires two types of instrumentation packets. The first
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instrumentation is a communication packet and response pair which is known to work on
the target device. This instrumentation is typically unrelated to the mutated protocol.
This instrumentation confirms the device network stack is still functioning and
responsive. It is possible the portion of the network stack associated with the mutated
protocol will hang without affecting other parts of the network stack. For example, a
UDP mutation may hang the UDP stack, but leave the TCP stack functioning correctly.
The second instrumentation request type is a known good packet of the type being
mutated. This instrumentation confirms the portion of the network stack related to the
mutated protocol is still functioning and responsive.
Some services were capable of assignment to a variable TCP or UDP port
number. In this case, protocol mutation was repeated for multiple ports. A good strategy
for testing services with variable ports is to repeat testing with port assigned to multiple
port numbers in the well known space (0-1023), multiple port numbers in the registered
port range (1023-49151), and multiple port numbers in the private range (49152-65535).
Some services are capable of assignment to a fixed set of port numbers. In this case, it is
good practice to test at all legal port assignments.
The MU-4000 includes built-in protocol mutation capabilities for many well
known protocols. Some protocols are not supported. For example, IEEE C37.118 is not
natively supported. Also, newly developed protocols may not initially be supported. The
MU-4000 is capable of learning protocols from Wireshark packet captures. After
learning a protocol the MU-4000 scenario builder can generate protocol mutations to test
a device. The scenario builder feature was used for IEEE C37.118 protocol mutation.
Only frames received as input by the target device should be mutated and sent to the
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target device. Mutated IEEE C37.118 commands frames were mutated and sent to PMUs.
Mutated IEEE C37.118 configuration and data frames were sent to the PDCs.
Protocol Mutation testing may indentify individual packets which cause device
failures including hanging network stacks or causing the device under test to reset itself.
Protocol Mutation testing may also indentify combinations of packets which cause
similar device failures. In both cases careful study is required to determine the root cause
of the failure. Mitigation of detected vulnerabilities can be achieved with a firewall or
signature based intrusion prevention system (IPS) rules to block problem traffic.
Vulnerabilities identified using protocol mutation should also be reported to the device
vendor. Protocol mutation identified multiple issues on devices tested for this work.
Issues included crashing of individual network services, crashing of applications running
on devices, and unintended soft resetting of affected devices.
The MU-4000 works best as a client which sends mutated packets to a server.
The MU-4000 uses randomization algorithms and constrained randomization algorithms
to fuzz servers. The MU-4000 is less capable of fuzzing server to client responses,
especially responses which are dependent upon the previous packet sent from the client.
To overcome this issue an in-line fuzzer was developed to mutate server to client packets.
The current version of the in-line fuzzer simply varies random bits of the server to client
response to attempt to break random protocol rules. This method has proven effective at
identifying vulnerabilities. A fuzzer is needed which properly mutates server to client
responses based upon previous client to server packets and system state. The next section
is analysis of the needs of such a fuzzer for IEEE C37.118 packets.
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3.4.2.2

A fuzzing framework for IEEE C37.118 protocol
The fuzzer for IEEE C37.118 protocol must be able to fuzz server to client

responses, especially responses which are dependent upon the previous packet sent from
the client. To achieve this a fuzzing framework was developed to mutate server to client
packets. The current version of the fuzzing framework is able to perform both dumb
fuzzing and smart fuzzing for IEEE C37.118 packets. Dumb fuzzing flips bits of the
server-to-client response to attempt to break random protocol rules, while smart fuzzing
mangles the specific fields of data packets according to the protocol specifications.
The fuzzing framework is designed based on the communication patterns of the
IEEE C37.118 protocol. The fuzzing framework mutates server to client responses based
upon previous client to server packets and system state. There are four types of packets
defined in IEEE C37.118 protocol [50]: header, command, configuration, and data. The
communication pattern between PMU and PDC is depicted in Figure 3.5 where PMU is
the server and PDC is the client. The IEEE C37.118 protocol is an application layer
protocol that can be carried in the TCP payload or UDP payload. Since UDP protocol is
much faster and easy to implement, in this testing the communication between the PMU
and PDC is configured to use IEEE C37.118 based on UDP. Communication is initiated
by the PDC (i.e. client) through sending a command frame that tells the PMU (i.e. server)
to start to stream measurements to the PDC. The command frame can also deliver other
commands such as a stop command, request configuration frame command, and others.
The PMU which receives the start command then knows where to send its C37.118
packets. However, before sending the data frames the PMU sends a configuration frame
to the PDC in which the PMU communicates the organization and size of its data frames.
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There are two types of configuration frames: configuration frame 1 and configuration
frame 2. The configuration frame 1 contains the constant part of the PMU configuration
and therefore it usually needs to be sent only once the first time PMU is connected to
PDC. The configuration frame 2 contains a variable part of the PMU configuration e.g.
number of phasors. Hence the configuration frame 2 has to be sent every time the PMU is
connected to the PDC such that PDC will know whether there are changes in the PMU
and update them. The PMU then starts to send the data frames at a rate ranging from 30
to 120 frames per second. The data frame contains real time phasor data e.g. magnitude,
phase angle, frequency, analog, digital data. The Header frame contains up to 80
characters of human readable/ASCII with comments on the PMU, the data sources,
scaling algorithms or any other information. The Header frame is rarely used.

Command Frame
Configuration Frame 1/2

PMU

Data Frame

PDC

Header Frame

Figure 3.5

PMU and PDC communication pattern

Only frames received as input by the target device should be mutated and sent to
the target device for the purpose of testing whether the target can handle the mutated
packets properly. According to different synchrophasor devices since each of them
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accepts different frames shown by the arrows in Figure 3.5, different fuzzing strategies
are used. For testing the PDC, three types of frames should be considered: configuration
frame 1 or 2, data frame, and the header frame. As for the PMU, the command frame and
the header frame are mutated for testing.
A typical fuzzing framework usually consists of three parts: test case generation;
target monitoring, and logging pertinent data on failure [49]. A fuzzing framework for
network protocols requires a tool to capture valid protocol traffic [51]. One such tool can
be a sniffer that dynamically captures the network packets at runtime. The structure of the
fuzzing framework designed for IEEE C37.118 protocol is shown in Figure 3.6. The
fuzzing framework is executed on a Linux computer that connects to the substation
switch. The fuzzing framework consists of five major parts: man-in-the-middle (MITM)
server, protocol parser, fuzzing engine, validation engine and log, in which the MITM
server captures the IEEE C37.118 protocol packets; the fuzzing engine generates the test
cases; validation engine monitors the devices under test and log stores not only the test
cases that crash the devices but also the activities of the fuzzing framework.
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Fuzzing Engine

Configration
Frame Fuzzer

Data Frame
Fuzzer

Header Frame
Fuzzer

Structure of the fuzzing framework for IEEE C37.118 protocol

The MITM server is implemented using Ettercap . Ettercap is a sniffer written in
C language that features passive and active sniffing in the communication channel,
content filtering on the fly and many other MITM attacks. The Ettercap in this fuzzer
redirects all the packets between PMU and PDC to the fuzzing framework PC by
spoofing the Media Access Control (MAC) addresses of the PMU and PDC such that it
pretends to be the PMU for the PDC and pretends to be the PDC for the PMU. This is
achieved by sending the Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) packets to the victim
devices with the MAC address replaced with the MITM server’s. Ettercap then captures
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the IEEE C37.118 packets off the wire, layers the new IEEE C37.118 packets onto UDP
packets and finally transmits the new packets onto the network. The new IEEE C37.118
packet has its fields altered according to the type of fuzzing chosen. The content of IEEE
C37.118 packet is modified using Scapy [54]. Scapy is an open source Python program
that provides a Domain Specific Langurage (DSL) that enables the users to describe any
kind of packet using the Python syntax and interpreter. In the fuzzing framework, Scapy
is used to accomplish IEEE C37.118 packet assembly, packet editing, packet re-play and
packet decoding.
When an IEEE C37.118 packet is captured by the MITM server, it hands the
packet to the “protocol parser” where the packet is decoded into one of the four types of
the IEEE C37.118 frames. The protocol parser is a Python module that has been
developed to describe the IEEE C37.118 protocol based on DSL provided by Scapy. The
frame type field is examined to determine which type of IEEE C37.118 frames the packet
belongs to. Then the packet will be forwarded to the corresponding fuzzer for mutations
by the “fuzzing engine”.
The fuzzing engine is composed of four frame fuzzers that mutate different types
of IEEE C37.118 frames. Each frame fuzzer accomplishes packet editing by applying
either dumb fuzzing or smart fuzzing to the packet. The smart fuzzing has predefined
mutations to the fields of the packet according to the protocol standard. For example, the
field FRAMESIZE of the packet is changed such that it does not match the actual size of
that packet [56]. Besides the common fields that all types of frames have, each type of
frame also has its unique fields. For example, the IEEE C37.118 command frame has two
unique fields. One of them is the CMD field that is a 2 bytes field specifying the
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command. There are 6 defined values for this field. However, a smart fuzzer for
command frame is designed to replace the CMD with a value that is not one of the 6 legal
values.
3.4.2.2.1

Smart fuzzing

Smart fuzzing mutates the packets based on the protocol specifications. IEEE
C37.118 includes 4 types of packets; header, command, configuration, and data. Header
and command packets are transmitted from the PDC to the PMU. Configuration and
command packets are transmitted from the PMU to the PDC.
All 4 frame types include a 2 byte synchronization word (SYNC). The first byte
of the SYNC is defined as always 0xAA. It is important to check other values for this
field. The second byte of the SYNC field includes a reserved bit, 3 bits to designate the
frame type, and 4 bits for version number. There are 5 legal frame types. Illegal frame
types should be sent; 0b101, 0b110, 0b111. All 16 possible version number possibilities
should be sent; though only some have been defined to date. All 4 IEEE C37.118 frame
types include a 2 byte frame size field. Frames should be sent with frame sizes which do
not match the actual FRAMESIZE. Also, very large frame sizes should be sent to test for
buffer overflow possibilities. A 4 frame types include a 2 byte IDCODE field. This value
is the PMU or PDC ID number. The values 0 and 65535 are reserved and therefore
should be tested. PMU and PDC typically have preprogrammed ID values. Frames with
IDCODE values not assigned to the target device should be tested. All 4 IEEE C37.118
frame types include a 4 byte SOC field. The SOC field is a time stamp that counts the
number of seconds since Jan-01-1970. The field is limited to 136 years which means the
max value is 0xB34C00. Above 0xB34C00 the count is supposed to roll over. It is
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important to test values greater than 0xB34C00. All 4 IEEE C37.118 frame types include
a 4 byte FRACSEC field. This field is broken into two parts. The most significant 4 bits
of FRACSEC (bits 31-28) are used to document the presence of a leap second. Bit 31 is
reserved and therefore transmitting a 1 in this bit should be tested. Bits 30 (LEAP)
indicates a leap second is occurring. Bit 29 (LEAPED) indicates a leap second occurred
in the last 24 hours. Bit 28 (TOLEAP) indicates a leap second will occur in the next
second. Various fuzzing scenarios can be derived for these fields. First, the leap second
bits should be asserted at times and dates when they are not expected. Seconds, LEAP
should be set without first setting TOLEAP in the previous second. LEAP should be set
without setting LEAPED in the following second and 24 hours. TOLEAP should be set
with no following LEAP assertion. LEAPED should be asserted when not preceded by
TOLEAP or LEAD combinations. Finally, all three bits (LEAP, LEAPED, TOLEAP)
should be asserted at random times. The next 4 bits of FRACSEC (bits 27-24) are
defined by a table to indicate clock faults and clock synchronization values. There are
multiple reserved values (0b1100, 0b1101, 0b1110) which should be tested. The
remainder of the FRACSEC field is a number fraction of a second. This value is
depended upon the TIMEBASE value from the PMU configuration frame. This value can
be changed when configuring the PMU. FRACSEC values which do not match with the
programmed TIMEBASE should be tested. Finally, All 4 IEEE C37.118 frame types
include a 2 byte CHK field which is a 16-bit CRC. Frames with invalid CRC values
should be tested. Some fuzzers make changes to valid packets by randomly flipping bit
values. In this case the fuzzer should ensure that the CHK field is correct to ensure that
more that the CRC logic is being tested.
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The IEEE C37.118 data frame has multiple unique fields. Since data frames are
transmitted from the PMU to PDC fuzzing data frames is limited to the PDC. The STAT
field is a 2 byte field which provides PMU status. This field includes multiple reserved
and user defined bits. All combinations of these bits should be tested. The PHASORS,
FREQ, DFREQ, ANALOG, and DIGITAL fields all vary in size according to values in
the configuration frame.

The configuration frame is sent from the PMU to PDC during

initial session start-up. Tests should include varying the number of values in these fields
to not match the configuration frame definitions. Variation should include 0 bytes,
larger, and smaller number of bytes for each field. PDC concentrate multiple
synchrophasor streams from PMU into a single stream of IEEE C37.118 data frames. As
such the size of the data frames output from PDC varies according to the number of PMU
which is defined in a configuration from sent from the PDC to its upstream client, an
EMS, state estimator, or openPDC. It is important to test varying data frame sizes. Very
large sizes should be tested to check for buffer overflow vulnerabilities. Also, it is
important to test data frame sizes which do not match the configuration frame.
The IEEE C37.118 configuration frame has multiple unique fields. Since
configuration frames are transmitted from the PMU to PDC fuzzing data frames is
limited to the PDC. Fuzzing PDC configuration frames is a challenge because the PDC
typically requests the configuration frame only once when the session is initiated. The
PDC can be forced to request a configuration frame update by asserting bit 10 in the
STAT word of a data frame send from the PMU to PDC. Bit 10 of the STAT word
indicates the configuration has changed and the PDC should request to read the
configuration files. The TIME_BASE field is 4 bytes. The most significant byte of
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TIME_BASE is reserved. Tests should be conducted with these bits set to non legal
values (0-255). The NUM_PMU field 2 byte field which specifies the number of PMU in
a data frame. This field can legally be up to 65535. However, the actual limit is less than
65535 since the maximum FRAMESIZE is 65535. The actual limit depends upon the
values of PHNMR, ANNMR, DGNMR, and FORMAT which set the number of phasors,
analog values, digital values, and format of said values for each PMU in the frame.
Testing combinations of NUM_PMU and the PHNMR, ANNMR, DGNMR, and
FORMAT which result in greater than 65535 bytes in the data frame is important. Also,
testing combinations of NUM_PMU and PHNMR, ANNMR, DGNMR, and FORMAT
which result in do not match the data in the data frames is important. The CHNAM field
is specified as 16*(PHNMR+ ANNMR +16 *DGNMR). Testing combinations of
CHNAM, PHNMR, ANNMR, and DGNMR which do not adhere to the previous
definition is important. The FORMAT field specifies the data type of FREQ, DFREQ,
PHASORS, and ANALOG fields from the data frame. Testing combinations of
FORMAT which do not match the values in the FREQ, DFREQ, PHASORS, and
ANALOG fields in the data frame is important. Bits 15-4 of the FORMAT field are
reserved. Testing non-zero fields in this field is important. The PHUNIT field of the
configuration frame is 4 bytes. The most significant byte has legal values of 0 or 1.
Testing should be completed to send values 2-255 in this byte. The ANUNIT field is a 4
byte field. The most significant byte of this field has several constraints. Values 3-4 are
undefined by the specification. Values 5-64 are reserved. Values 65-255 are user
definable. All values from 3-255 should be tested. THE DIGUNIT is 4 byte mask of the
DIGITAL field from the data frame. Bits 63-48 and 32-16 are a mask which indicates the
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normal status of the digital bit corresponding to that bit lane. Test should be conducted to
change normal status bit values for bits not in use in the DIGITAL field of the data frame.
Test should also be conducted to inverts the normal value for bits which are in use in the
DIGITAL field in the data frame. Bits 47-33 and 15-0 are masks which indicate which
bytes are in use. Tests should be conducted to deselect DIGITAL field bits which are
actually in use and select DIGITAL field bits which are not actually in use. The FNOM
field is a 2 byte field which sets the nominal frequency. Only two values are allowed 0
and 1. Tests should be conducted for values from 2-65535. The DATA_RATE field is a 2
byte signed integer representing the number of frames per second. Typically this value
will be 30, 60 or 120 frames per second. However, the legal values are [-32767, 32767].
Testing should be conducted for multiple values throughout this range. Additionally, the
value 0x8000 should also be tested since it fits in the field but is not specified as legal
since it is effectively -0. CFGCNT is a 2 byte field which indicates the number of
configuration changes since installation. This value should be varied out of order and
changed to large values to test PDC response.
The IEEE C37.118 command frame has two unique fields. Command frames are
sent to PMU. Command frames may also be sent to the upstream facing interface of the
PDC. The CMD field is a 2 byte field specifying the command. There are 6 defined
values for this field. Undefined values should be sent to the device to test behavior.
EXITFRAME is a variable length field from 0-65518 bytes. This size is limited by the
FRAMESIZE field in the command frame. The value of EXITFRAME is user defined.
Tests should be conducted to send non-zero size EXITFRAMEs. Also, test should be
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conducted in which the FRAMZSIZE is too large or too small based upon the size of the
EXITFRAME field.
The IEEE C37.118 header frame has one type of unique field. Header frames are
read from the PMU and therefore fuzzing of header frames is directed at the PMU. The
header frame may have up to K ASCII bytes of data. The number of bytes of data is the
FRAMESIZE – 16. The maximum number of data bytes is therefore 65519. Header
frames should be tested with non-ASCII characters in the data bytes of a header frame.
Header frames with non-printable characters should also be tested in the data byte fields.
Finally, testing should be conducted when the FRAMESIZE specified incorrect for the
number of data bytes transmitted.
3.4.2.2.2

Dumb fuzzing

Dumb fuzzing perform packet mutation without knowing the protocol
specifications. Therefore, a dumb fuzzer create test cases by flipping bits in a capture
packet. In this work, the dumb fuzzing is implemented through a file fuzzer – ZZUF [53].
ZZUF was originally designed as an application input fuzzer that intercepts file
operations and changes random bits in the program’s inputs. Therefore ZZUF has no
ability to mutate network packets. To resolve this, the about-to-be-mutated IEEE C37.118
packet is written into a temporary file as binary strings. Instead of fuzzing the packet, the
binary file is mutated by ZZUF. The output from ZZUF is layered upon a UDP packet
and forwarded by the MITM server to the target.
How ZZUF mutates the binary file is exclusively determined by two of its
parameters: fuzzing ratio and seeds. This feature of ZZUF is convenient to the tester for
easily reproducing the mutated packets and later replaying the bugs. The fuzzing ratio
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indicates the proportion of bits that ZZUF changes. A fuzzing ratio of 1/command frame
length (bits) was used to cause ZZUF to invert 1 bit per fuzzed packet. The fuzzing ratio
is approximate. The actual test results show each packet had 1-10 randomly changed bits.
The fuzzing results can be reproducible by specifying the “seed” parameter if the ratio is
fixed. For example, if the ratio is fixed to 0.01 which means 1% of bits in the packet are
inverted, the seed number 1 will always choose the same bits for inversion by ZUFF.
Therefore, if a mutated packet crashes the target device, we are able to reproduce this
packet if we recorded the original packet and the ratio and seed. This task is done by the
logging system of the fuzzing framework. The logging system records all activities of the
fuzzing framework as well as the malicious packets that crash a device under test.
The validation system starts sending validation packets through the MITM server
after each mutated packet being sent to the target. There are two methods in this
framework to validate whether the target survives the malicious input: Internet Control
Message Protocol (ICMP) echo and HTTP request. The first method is suitable for all
types of devices that are networked to the switch while the second method is only
available to the devices that are running an HTTP server. The ICMP validation sends
ICMP echo request packets and expects a response from the target device. The HTTP
validation sends a “GET” request and expects the webserver to return a webpage. The
tester can choose either or both as the validation method. If the target device fails to
respond to the ICMP request or HTTP GET request it will be regarded as a crash and
then the original packet (packet before being mutated) is recorded in the file system and
the ratio and seed information about ZZUF is logged for the future analysis.
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3.4.2.2.3

Fuzzing algorithms for different IEEE C37.118 frames

This section describes four algorithms to mutate IEEE C37.118 frames using both
smart fuzzing and dumb fuzzing via ZUFF. The fuzzing ratio for ZUFF is fixed such that
only 1 bit of the frame is flipped.
3.4.2.2.3.1

Configuration Frame Fuzzing

The configuration frame fuzzer alters data frames and forwards these altered
configuration frames to the device under test, i.e. PDC. Before the fuzzing starts the
connection between PMU and PDC needs to be established. This is done by the MITM
server by examining whether data frames streaming from the PMU to PDC have been
captured. To provide a large set of fuzzable configuration frames the MITM server makes
a change data frames request. A data frame has its STATUS field changed to value of
0x0004. This informs the PDC that the configuration of PMU has been changed and thus
the PDC should send a command frame requesting the new configuration frame. The
approach to fuzz a configuration frame is shown in Table 3.3.
3.4.2.2.3.2

Data Frame Fuzzing

The data frame fuzzer alters data frames and forwards these altered data frames to
the device under test, i.e. PDC. Data frame fuzzing only requires a connection between
PMU and PDC to be established before running the MITM server. The algorithm for
fuzzing the data frame is listed in Table 3.4.
3.4.2.2.3.3

Command Frame Fuzzing

The command frame fuzzer alters command frames and forwards these altered
command frames to the device under test, i.e. PMU. A simple way to provide a large set
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of fuzzable command frames is to use SCAPY to generate a normal command frame
from which the mutated command frames are created. This is done by the protocol parser.
In this case the MITM server does not necessarily need to perform ARP spoofing to
intercept the connection between PMU and PDC. Instead, the MITM server initiates the
connection to PDC by sending a “Transmission On” command. The PMU responds to
this command by starting to stream data frames. When the fuzzer detects the connection
between the MITM server and PDC has been established the fuzzing process starts.
Besides the two validation methods, ICMP echo request and HTTP GET request, there is
one more way to inspect whether the target device survived the command frame fuzzing.
This is through examining whether the target device continues streaming data frames.
This is necessary because it is possible that the device’s network stack is working
properly (by responding ICMP echo request) but the Synchrophasor processing unit has
crashed due to the fuzzing. However, this validation is not suitable for fuzzing the
command “Transmission Off” as this command is originally used to stop the streaming.
Algorithm 3 lists the approach to fuzz a command frame. There are 6 types of command
frames: “Transmission On”; “Transmission Off”; “Send Header”; “Send Configure frame
1”; “Send Configure frame 2” and “Send extra frames”. To fuzz all 6 types of frames a
loop is created between step 2 and step 16 such that the protocol parser can create the 6
types of command frames. The algorithm for fuzzing command frames are summarized
in Table 3.5.
3.4.2.2.3.4

Header Frame Fuzzing

The header frame fuzzer alters header frames and forwards these altered header
frames to the device under test, i.e. PDC. This fuzzing can performed after the connection
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between PMU and PDC is established. To provide a large set of fuzzable header frames,
a command frame that requests a header frame from PMU needs to be created by the
fuzzer and sent to the PMU. This informs the PMU to send a header frame from which
the mutations can be made. The approach to fuzz a header frame is shown in Table 3.6.
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Table 3.3

Algorithm for configuration frame fuzzing

Algorithm 1 configuration frame fuzzing approach
1: Initiate fuzzing ratio and set seed number to 0.
2: MITM server captures a packet and hands to Protocol Parser
3: if the packet is data frame:
4:

MITM server alters data frame to cause
configuration frame transmission.

5:

go back to step 2

6: elseif the packet is configuration frame:
7:

ZZUF alters bits in the frame OR smart fuzzer for
deliberate changes in specific fields

8: else

go back to step 2

9: MITM server forwards altered frame to device under test.
10: Validation Engine sends ICMP echo request or/and HTTP GET
request to the device.
11: if responses are captured:
12:

(device survived) pass

13: else

recorder the configuration frame, fuzzing ratio and

the seed number.
14: Increase seed number by 1
15: if seed number == maximum seed number:
16:

stop fuzzing

17: else

go to step 2
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Table 3.4

Algorithm for data frame fuzzing approach
Algorithm 2 data frame fuzzing approach

1: Initiate fuzzing ratio and set seed number to 0.
2: MITM server captures a packet and hands to Protocol Parser
3: if the packet is data frame:
4:

ZZUF alters bits in the frame OR smart fuzzer makes
deliberate changes in specific fields.

5: else

go back to step 2

6: MITM server forwards altered frame to device under test.
7: Validation Engine sends ICMP echo request or/and HTTP GET
request to the device.
8: if responses are captured:
9:

(device survived) pass

10: else

recorder the data frame, fuzzing ratio and the seed

number.
11: Increase seed number by 1
12: if seed number == maximum seed number:
13:

stop fuzzing

14: else

go to step 2
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Table 3.5

Algorithm for command frame fuzzing
Algorithm 3 command frame fuzzing approach

1: Initiate fuzzing ratio and set seed number to 0.
2: MITM server sends a “Transmission on” command
3: if the received packet is NOT data frame:
4:

go to step 2

5: else:
6:

Protocol Parser creates a normal command frame

7:

ZZUF alters random bits in the frame or smart
fuzzer makes deliberate changes in specific fields

8:

MITM server forwards altered frame to device under
test.

9:

Validation Engine sends ICMP echo request or/and
HTTP GET request to the device.

10:

if responses and data frames (not suitable for
“Transmission off” command) are captured:

11:
12:

(device survived) pass
else recorder the command frame, fuzzing ratio and
the seed number.

13:

Increase seed number = seed number + 1

14:

if seed number == maximum seed number:

15:

stop fuzzing

16:

else go to step 2
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Table 3.6

Algorithm for header frame fuzzing
Algorithm 4 header frame fuzzing approach

1: Initiate fuzzing ratio and set seed number to 0.
2: MITM server captures a packet and hands to Protocol Parser
3: if the packet is data frame:
4:

MITM server sends a command frame to cause header
frame transmission. Then go to step 2

5: elseif the packet is header frame:
6:

ZZUF alters bits in the frame OR smart fuzzer for
deliberate changes in specific fields

7: else

go to step 2

8: MITM server forwards altered frame to device under test.
9: Validation Engine sends ICMP echo request or/and HTTP GET
request to the device.
10: if responses are captured:
11:

(device survived) pass

12: else

recorder the configuration frame, fuzzing ratio and

the seed number.
13: Increase seed number = seed number + 1
14: if seed number == maximum seed number:
15:

stop fuzzing

16: else

go to step 2
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The structure of the in-line fuzzer is also suitable for fuzzing other network
protocols. As long as the protocol to be fuzzed is an open standard a corresponding
protocol parser can be developed. This is referred to as “white box” testing. For
proprietary protocols in which protocol specification is unavailable only dumb fuzzing is
possible. The next section provides a methodology to fuzz a typical energy management
system in which an intelligent dumb fuzzing framework is proposed.
3.4.3

Energy management system fuzzing framework
The energy management system (EMS) consists of a set of computer applications

and databases that help operators in electricity utilities perform monitoring, control, and
optimization of the performance of the electricity power grid. In general, the EMS system
structure is shown in Figure 3.7 where the client is an application programming interface
(API) that provides a human machine interface (HMI) to the operators. The client API
communicates with different applications that may be located in a super server. Each
application performs corresponding analysis and calculation according to the requests
from the client. Multiple applications may run simultaneously. The databases provide
necessary data and operations descriptions for the applications and they can be running in
the same super server or distributed in different super servers. The communication
between the client API and applications usually uses proprietary protocols that are not
open to the public. The EMS system fuzzing framework in this work is meant to test
applications within the EMS system that listen on a network interface of the super server.
The fuzzer sends anomalous input to attempt to crash EMS applications in order to reveal
the security vulnerabilities of the EMS system. The structure of fuzzing framework is not
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only limited to EMS super server but also could be used as a network fuzzer to any other
distributed database systems.
The test bed for testing the proposed fuzzing framework has one client machine
and one super server. This test bed assumes that client can be run either remotely or
locally along with an application. The test bed also assumes that the tester is able to
access the application machine and source code for the purpose of debugging. In
addition, the assumption that the protocol does not have checksum validation or the
checksum is disabled in the communication is necessary.

Super Server(s)

...
DB 1

App 1

DB n

...

App n

Client (Human-machine Interface)

Figure 3.7

A general structure for EMS system
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The fuzzing framework for the EMS system is based on the Basic Fuzzing
Framework (BFF) [55]. The BFF was originally designed to test applications running
locally on Linux and Mac OS X platforms. The fuzzing framework designed for this
work aims to test applications running over a network with the proprietary protocol.
Nevertheless, the design is consistent with the four functions of a typical fuzzing
framework as stated in the previous section. The structure of the fuzzing framework is
depicted in Figure 3.8. The fuzzing method for this framework is limited to dumb fuzzing
because the protocol specifications are not available. And the fuzzing framework fuzzes
application layer protocols carried by the TCP/IP protocol.

Super Server

IP: 10.0.0.1

Client

IP: 10.0.0.2

Engine
Configuration File

MITM Server

Application

Fuzzing Engine

Debug Agent

ZZUF

Figure 3.8

Log

Structure of fuzzing framework for fuzzing EMS system super server

The fuzzing framework runs on the super server along with the EMS applications.
The fuzzing framework is composed by five components: MITM server; fuzzing engine;
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fuzzer: ZZUF; Debug Agent and the log. The applications running on the super server are
the targets of all fuzzing tests. The applications are configured to listen on ports of the
local network interface (127.0.0.1) of the super server. The client (10.0.0.1) in Figure 3.8
(outside the boundary of super server) is configured to communicate with the super
server over the local area network at 10.0.0.2. However, rather than using a sniffer as
with the fuzzing framework for the IEEE C37.118 protocol, the MITM server is a multithreaded process that runs on the super server and listens to TCP ports associated with IP
address of 10.0.0.2. When the client sends requests to 10.0.0.2, one of the threads of
MITM server captures these packets and forwards them to the application that is listening
to the destination port. The MITM server then will act like a proxy for relaying traffic
from the client to appropriate application on the super server. The fuzzer ZZUF mutates
packets captured by the MITM server and ZUFF is controlled by the fuzzing engine
according to some algorithm. In the engine configuration file, parameters for ZZUF are
specified such as start seed and maximum seed. A debug agent with local access to the
application source code is attached to the application process to detect when an exception
is raised. The debug agent uses GDB. When GDB detects a program exit number other
than 9 (which is normal exit). It records the debugging information to the log and also
communicates with the fuzzing engine to record the packet along with seed number and
fuzzing range.
3.5

Developing Snort rules for detecting attacks
Snort rules are capable of tracking the number of packets from a given source in a

specified time period. Such Snort rules can alert if a flooding attack is detected. A SYN
flood rule for an IEEE C37.118 interface should take into account the normal and
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extraordinary, yet still valid, volumes of traffic expected on the network interface. In
normal operation, using IEEE C37.118, the PDC sends commands to the PMU to request
a configuration file. The PMU responds with a configuration file and then begins to
stream synchrophasor measurements, data packets, at 30, 60, or 120 packets per second.
This process should generate one TCP session and therefore only one TCP SYN packet
should be sent per synchrophasor session. A PDC may connect to multiple PMU and
therefore may have multiple active TCP sessions on port 4712, the port assigned for
IEEE C37.118. PMU and PDC also commonly have other TCP services. Each open port
of the tested PMU and PDC was tested with TCP SYN flood attacks. In all case devices
were 100% responsive to TCP SYN floods of less than or equal to 1000 packets per
second. The two rules below detect TCP SYN flood attacks against any port on PMU or
PDC. The rules alert for more than 1000 TCP packets in one second. This threshold
value can likely be significantly decreased without causing spurious alerts.

alert tcp any any -> $PDCIP any (msg:“Syn Flood to PDC”;\
flags:S,CE; flow:to_server; threshold: type threshold,
track by_src, count 1000, seconds 1; priority:3;
sid:1000001;)

alert tcp any any -> $PMUIP any (msg:“Syn Flood to PMU”;\
flags:S,CE; flow:to_server; threshold: type threshold,
track by_src, count 1000, seconds 1; priority:3;
sid:1000002;)
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Flooding attacks performed in device testing included ARP floods, IP floods, TCP
SYN floods, TCP SYN FIN floods, UDP floods, ICMP floods. In each case SNORT
rules can be derived to detect the floods.
Protocol mutation testing was performed with the MU-4000. Protocol mutation,
also known as fuzzing, checks device response to broken protocol rules. Protocol
mutation can be performed at any network layer. In this section we provide
MODBUS/TCP and IEEE C37.118 protocol mutation examples.
One MODBUS/TCP device tested reset itself when the LENGTH field of was less
than the actual length remainder of the MODBUS/TCP packet. The rule below confirms
that the specified bytes remaining are actually in the packet. This rule was taken from a
rule set developed by Digital Bond [57].

alert tcp $MODBUS_SERVER 502 <> $MODBUS_CLIENT any
(flow:established;\
byte_jump:2,4; isdataat:0,relative; msg:"SCADA_IDS: Modbus TCP \
Incorrect Packet Length, Possible DOS Attack"; \
reference:url,digitalbond.com/tools/quickdraw/Modbus-tcp-rules; \
classtype:non-standard-protocol; sid: 1000003; rev:1;
priority:2;)

Because much of this work was done under confidentiality agreement, other Snort
rules written were not included in this chapter as they would indirectly divulge the
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vulnerabilities identified in testing. In addition, a set of Snort rules are developed for
malicious C37.118 packets as in [58], which were validated by aforementioned fuzzer.
3.6

Conclusion
In this chapter, cyber security testing methodologies for synchrophasor system are

provided. Results of the testing were reported to the sponsoring electric utilities and to
the hardware and software vendors to aid in understanding the impacts of cyber-attacks to
the synchrophasor system and assist vendors and the utility to deploy defense
mechanisms. Two fuzzing frameworks for network protocol and distributed computing
systems were developed to identify vulnerabilities of synchrophsor devices and the
energy management system. Different fuzzing methodologies were used depending on
different characteristics of the target under test. The fuzzing frame work for IEEE
C37.118 protocol can be used as an attack tool that modifies measurements carried by
IEEE C37.118 data frames. Additionally, the fuzzer for IEEE C37.118 data frames can be
easily changed to modify any value in C37.118 data frames but make the data frames still
compliant with the protocol specification. Such frames therefore may not be detected by a
traditional IDS such as Snort.
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CHAPTER IV
DETECTION FOR FAULT AND CYBER ATTACK IN POWER SYSTEM BY
MINING SYNCHROPHASOR DATA

4.1

Introduction
Situational awareness technologies have been studied and continuously improved

for decades. The need to continue situational awareness improvements is motivated by
recent power disturbances which have led to large scale blackouts [59]. A power system
disturbance, such as a transmission line fault, can initiate a chain of reactions which lead
to a cascading blackout if timely actions from operators are not taken. Poor visibility
across the power system may also cause the significance of an event to be misunderstood
and lead to incorrect control actions by operators in control centers. Additionally, as
power systems increasingly depend on communication infrastructures to provide the
wide-area monitoring and control, power systems are exposed to the threat of cyberattacks. Cyber-attacks are another form of power system contingency. Attacks that target
power systems can exploit vulnerabilities in control devices and communication links to
corrupt the control and measurement signals [7][60], and interrupt monitoring algorithms
[67]. Cyber-attacks which corrupt control and measurement signals can be disguised as
power system disturbances or control actions. Situational awareness technologies are
needed which distinguish between actual power system disturbances related to natural
events, and cyber-attacks. The emphasis of this work is not on classifying disturbance
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types as quite a number of methods have been proposed to do so in the power system, but
on distinguishing between disturbances and cyber-attacks. There are three reasons it is
important to distinguish disturbances from cyber-attacks. First, in the case that a cyberattack impersonates a disturbance or control action, proper classfication will lead to
proper response. Calssifying a cyber-attack as a disturbance or control action can lead to
improper response and cause an outage or other negative impact on the power system.
Conversely, incorrectly classifying a disturbance or control action as a cyber-attack can
lead to improper response within the information and communications technology (ICT)
system. Second, a single classifer which idenitfies all types of power system
contingiences is needed as an input to automated event response algorithms such as
autonomic management frameworks, system integrity protection schemes (SIPS) [13],
and wide area protection systems (WAPS) [12]. This work presents a methodology to
mine the patterns for disturbances and cyber-attacks using a two-dimensional graph from
logged heterogenuous system data, use common paths in the graph as signatures of each
type of modeled scenario, and finally, to classify specific disturbances and cyber-attacks.
For proof of concept, in this work we consider disturbances as different types of line-toground and line-to-line faults.
A new trend in power system situation awareness is the use of high-speed and
time-synchronized data. Compared to traditional supervisory control and data acquisition
(SCADA) systems that poll field sensors once per several seconds synchrophasor systems
allow measurement of up to 120 samples per second. Synchrophasor systems provide
measurements such as voltage, current, and frequency. Synchrophasor data was used in
this work for two reasons. First, the mining common path algorithm uses a set of system
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states in temporal order as a signature for each observed event type. High frequency
synchrophasor measurements enable identification of fast moving power system events.
Some power system events involve very fast changing behaviors and may last only a few
milliseconds [61]. For example, zone 1 faults are typically set to be cleared instantly. The
presence of a fault and system response of opening the breaker to clear the fault take just
a few cycles. These events can be missed by slower speed measurement systems. Second,
synchrophasor systems provide more accurate system state visibility due to the use of
time synchronized measurements. The mining common paths algorithm can leverage this
improved visibility to track events related to a single event from multiple synchronized
sensors. The high measurement frequency and time-synchronized characteristic offered
by synchrophasor systems create very large volumes of data and enable various
applications including Wide Area Monitoring Systems (WAMS), Wide Area Protection
Schemes (WAPS), and System Integrity Protection Schemes (SIPS) [12][13][11].
However, using synchrophasor data alone is not enough to detect cyber-attacks. Such
example can be a cyber-attack that mimics a real fault by first injecting false
measurements then tripping the relay. The status of other power system components such
as relays and breakers is also available as time-synchronized data via synchrophasor
systems [11]. Combining synchrophasor data with other system logs such as relay status
log and network event monitor logs can extend the situational awareness capabilities
provided by a synchrophasor system to detect cyber-attacks. But, this creates the
challenge of how heterogeneous data sources can be merged to train and use such a
classifier. This work provides a solution to this problem by proposing a data mining
approach that leverages the time-stamped data to extract temporal patterns which can be
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used to describe system behavior related to disturbances, control actions, and cyberattacks. Henceforth, disturbances, control actions, and cyber-attacks are collectively
referred to as scenarios.
In this work, a pattern for a scenario is presented as a common path that consists
of a sequence of system states in temporal order. A system state in a common path is
made up of multiple instantanious readings from available sensors from the system. One
advantage of the common path is that it overcomes the difficulty in analyzing time
domain waveforms by discovering the critical system states across very short time
intervals (in milliseconds). These common paths are mapped into a state machine with
two-dimensional coordinates for the scenario classification. The automatic process of
discovering common paths is introduced by using a case study in a simulated 3-bus 2-line
transmission system. For this work, a case study is provided which considers disturbances
including symmetric and unsymmetric faults and different cyber-attacks that mimic the
1LG fault to confuse operators in the control center. The cyber-attacks studied in this
work belong to masquerading and/or man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks that target
physical devices such as PMU and relays. These attacks may originate from a
compromised node in control center, sending control commands or measurement packets
covered by legitimate source IP addresses and legal packet formats. As such, it is
assumeed the masquerading packets cannot be detected by traditional network intrusion
detection systems. Validation of the mining common paths algorithm is based on
simulated data because actual synchrophasor data is not available for researchers due to
the proprietary nature of data, confidentiality issues, and lack of proper sharing
mechanism among researchers and institutes. Additionally, data sets captured from
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utilities contain a limited number of scenarios. This limits diversity in the data set. Some
power system scenarios are rare, especially cyber-atacks, hardware-in-the-loop (HIL)
simulation allows targeted dataset creation realistic scenarios captured from the same
commercial devices found in utilities. The same data sets used in this work has also been
used in [28] for synchrophasor data mining research.
This work has three primary contributions. First, this work demonstrates a new
classifier capable of distinguishing power system disturbances and cyber security attacks
that interrupt power system control actions and mimic real disturbances. Second, we use
the sequential pattern mining algorithm to mine fused heterogeneous data and create
common paths for each known scenario. Third, power systems are dynamic in nature
which leads to minor variations in system state for known scenarios. The classifier
presented in this work learns by parsing datasets marked with scenario type. The training
process results in an ordered sequence of system states, i.e. a path, representing each
unique instance of a scenario found in the dataset. To avoid overfitting the mining
common path algorithm was developed to discover critical states shared by similar paths
representing the same scenario. The result of the common path agorithm is a merged set
of paths representing all scenarios in the dataset. The classifier matches monitored state
transition patterns to common paths of known scenarios to provide a specific
classification of the observed behavior.
The remainder of this work is organized as follows. Section 4.2 discusses the
methodology, the process of mining common paths, and the classifier training and
validation phases. Section 4.3 introduces the case study test bed, test data, and test data
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preprocessing procedure. Section 4.4 presents the classification results of three
experiments. Section 4.5 concludes this work and proposes future work.
4.2
4.2.1

Mining common path
Sequential events for a power system scenario
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Figure 4.1

Ideal vs. actual SLG fault and protection system response

Power system scenarios can be described as an ordered sequence of measureable
events. For example, Figure 4.1 depicts phase a current magnitude during a single-lineto-ground (1LG) fault on a transmission line. The current magnitude can be quantized
into 3 ranges; high, normal, and low which are represented by dark grey, white, and light
grey shading on Figure 4.1. When the system is in a stable state, the current stays in the
normal range, marked as node A in Figure 4.1. When the 1LG fault occurs, current
increases to the high range via node B. The protection scheme will operate two relays, R1
and R2, at the both ends of the transmission line to open breakers and isolate the fault.
Current magnitude then drops through node C to zero. If following six notations are used
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to denote six events: “IR1=H” as node “B”, meaning “Current measured by R1 increases
to High”; “IR2=H” for “Current measured by R2 increases to High”; “R1=Trip” for
“Relay R1 trips”; “R2=Trip” for “Relay R2 trips”; “IR1=0” as node “C” for “Current
measured by R1 drops to Zero”; “IR1=0” for “Current measured by R2 drops to Zero”.
The timestamps of 1LG fault and resulting protection scheme operation can be
represented by expression (1) where t(∙) stands for the timestamp of corresponding
events.

tI R1 H   tI R 2 H   tR1Trip  tR 2Trip  tI R1 0   tR 20 

(4.1)

Expression (1) assumes a fault which appears at both relays at the same time and
assumes both relays operate at the same time. In fact, the fault may occur at different
locations along the line leading to variations in the time each relay observes the fault and
variations in relay operation time. Power systems are dynamic. In Figure 4.1, the dashed
line shows an ideal waveform of current magnitude during a fault and the solid line
graphs a waveform captured from Real Time Digital Simulator (RTDS) simulation of a
1LG fault. The actual waveform includes multiple variations from the ideal waveform. A
power system’s response to load variation, fault location variation, and transient
behaviors results in irregular waveforms. Such variations are reflected as dispersions in
the timestamps of node B and node C for different instances of the same scenario. The
dispersion in timestamps can be seen not only in the events related to the current
magnitude but also events related to other features. Figure 4.2 shows box plots of
timestamps of six events for three fault scenarios and one scenario where relays R1 and
R2 are tripped by attackers. The Figure 4.2 x-axis is the set of observed events. The box
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plots represent 40 instances of each scenario. To provide an ordered sequence the time
stamp of the first event in a sequence was subtracted from timestamps of all later events
in the sequence. The box plots and the interconnecting edges of a scenario are depicted
using the same color. As shown in Figure 4.2, events take place in temporal order. Event
timestamps vary due to system dynamics. For each scenario, a track can be drawn by
connecting box plot medians. The tracks shown in Figure 4.2 generally agree with
expression 1. Expert knowledge can be used to create similar expressions for all known
system behaviors. However, time variation prevents these from serving as signatures for
classification. This leads to the need for a graph to describe an ordered set of events
describing a scenario while comprehending the variation in times stamps.

Figure 4.2

Distribution of timestamps for events

Tracks are an ordered list of events with measurements where each vertice is an
event measured at a single sensor. The classifier presented in this work uses paths which
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are an ordered list of system states where a state is snapshot of measurements from all
available sensors at a given time instant. The steps taken to convert heterogeneous data
collected during a scenario into a path will be introduced in next section. Path vertices are
states and path edges are transitions between states. Paths are a means for providing
stateful monitoring of the system. The training process performed to create paths is
subject to over-fitting due to the time variations seen in Figure 4.2. In the over-fitting
case, different instances of the same scenario may have different paths. A technique for
mining common paths is provided below to identify shared critical states between a set of
paths for a scenario leaving a common path which comprehends the variation in
timestamps.
4.2.2

Mining common paths algorithm
Describing the Mining Common Paths algorithm requires definitions of the

concepts of state, feature, sequence, and path.
A state is used to represent a system’s instantaneous status. A state consists of a
set of observed system measurements or features f as well as a normalized time stamp
TS, i.e. S = {TS, f1,⋯,fn}. The value of a feature is read from a sensor. The possible
values for a feature are in a range called its domain. A feature that has continuous values
in its domain should be discretized to finite ranges to avoid an infinite state space.
A path P is a list of observed system states arranged in temporal order according
to their timestamps, namely Pi = {S1, S2, …, Sn}, ordered by increasing time. A sequence
s is a subset of a path, i.e. s ⊆ P. We denote a sequence s by {Si+1, Si+2, …, Si+m}. A path
P contains sequence s if all of the elements in s appear in P in the same order. In a set of
sequences, a sequence is maximal if the sequence is not contained in any other sequences.
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Let G be the set of all observed paths for a scenario Q so G = {P1, P2,…,Pn}
where n is the number of observed paths for Q. A path supports sequence s if the
sequence is contained in the path. Support can be defined as a metric in which the support
of sequence s is the percentage of paths in G that contain sequence s.
A common path for scenario Q is any sequence whose support is greater than a
minimum support threshold and is maximal. There may be multiple common paths for a
single scenario. Common paths reflect the states that occur most frequently for a
scenario. The process of mining common path is similar to mining frequent sequence
patterns as defined in [31].
Table 4.1

Example paths for a scenario
T1

T2

T3

T4

T5

P1

S1

S2

S3

S4

S5

P2

S1

S2

S3

S4

S5

Delayed States

P3

S1

S10

S2

S3

S4

S5

Extra States

P4

S1

S11

S3

S4

S5

Modified States

P5

S21

S22

S23

S24

S25

Error Path

Example

T6
Ideal Case

Consider the set of paths shown in Table 1. For the example G =

{P1, P2, P3, P4, P5}. If the minimum support threshold is set to 60%, the set of
sequences in G which meet the minimum support threshold includes {S1, S2, S3, S4, S5}
and {S1, S3, S4, S5}. For this example, {S1, S2, S3, S4, S5} is maximal and is therefore the
common path. The sequence {S1, S3, S4, S5} is not maximal because it is contained in
{S1, S2, S3, S4, S5}. If the minimum support threshold is changed to 70%, the set of
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sequences in G which meet the minimum support threshold includes only {S1, S3, S4, S5}.
Since only one sequence meets the threshold it is maximal and is a common path.
Table 4.1 also provides examples of types of paths. P1 represents the ideal case
for a path representing a scenario. P2 matches P1 except a subset of states are delayed.
This may occur due to timestamp variation of events or due to system dynamics. P3
contains an extra state. Dynamics may occur when a feature oscillates during a state
transition. P4 represents the case when a path is similar but a state is different from the
ideal case. This could happen when an event in a state (i.e. S2) does not occur due to the
variation in the timestamp, which results in a different state (i.e. S11). P5 represents an
error path. In the error path no sequences match the ultimate common path.
The common path is used as a signature during classification. Changing the
minimum support threshold changes the number of states in a common path and can
affect classification accuracy. It is not necessary to find a common path which matches
the ideal path, rather the goal is to find a common path which is unique for a scenario and
which leads to maximum classification accuracy. For a noisy system a shorter common
path may yield better classification results.
The common path must contain critical states about a group of paths, G. For
example, a common path for a 1LG fault should have a sequence of critical states
representing “current going high”, “relay trip” and “current falling to zero.” The ability to
find a common path is greatly dependent on the “quality” of paths in G. For example; if
there are a many error paths in G it will be difficult to find sequences which meet the
minimum support threshold.
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The rest of this work presents a case study which applies the mining common path
algorithm to a 3-bus 2-line transmission system for classifying four types of power
system symmetric and unsymmetrical faults and three cyber-attacks scenarios.
4.3

Power system test bed
A real world power system is dynamic and consists of thousands of buses, loads,

transmission lines, and other components. The power system operation goes through
various states and is a continuous process. The 3-bus 2-line transmission system used in
this work is modified from the IEEE 9-bus 3-generator system [62] according to our
simulation requirements. Although this system is relatively small it captures the essence
of the larger power system and is small enough to be comprehensible in every detail. This
system uses commercial PMU and relays from different major vendors. The test bed and
data sets exhibit behaviors of a real power system, yet fit into the resources available in
the lab in terms of hardware and software limitations. The transmission system used for
HIL simulation for this work is shown in Figure 4.3.
4.3.1

Power system scenarios
The power system disturbances and three types of attacks simulated for this work

are described as follows.
4.3.1.1

Power System Faults
In this work we consider symmetric and unsymmetrical faults in a power system

as the examples of disturbances. A power system fault is a condition where the system
voltage, current and frequency are abnormal. Typically, single line to ground (1LG)
faults, double lines to ground (2LG) faults, three lines to ground (3LG) faults and line to
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line (LL) faults represent greater than 95% of faults in a power system [63]. In this work,
for proof of concept we simulated phase-a-to-ground fault for 1LG faults, phase-a-b-toground faults for 2LG faults, phase a-b-c-to-ground fault for (3LG) faults, and phase-ato-b line to line fault for LL faults.
4.3.1.2

Trip command injection attack
Trip command injection attacks create contingencies by remotely sending

unexpected relay trip commands from an attacker’s computer to relays at the ends of a
transmission line. The trip command injection attack used for this work closely mimics
the 1LG fault. The attack was implemented against relay R1 and R2 by replaying relay
trip commands captured from MODBUS/TCP network traffic. However, we assume
these commands are sent from a compromised legitimate computer such that these
commands cannot be detected by network event monitor (e.g. Snort) as attacks since they
are from a valid source and have valid formats. The two relay trip commands open the
breakers at the ends of transmission line L1. This attack stresses the system by forcing L2
to carry more power flow which may cause cascading failures in a power system.
However, for this work, cascading failures were not simulated. The trip command
injection attack instances were created under random load conditions in the same range
used for faults.
4.3.1.3

Aurora attack
The Aurora vulnerability refers to potential harm caused to a generator by

intentionally opening and closing a breaker near the generator in rapid succession [71]. In
this work, an aurora cyber-attack was simulated which periodically sends opening85

closing commands to relays that cause the breaker on the transmission line to open and
close at a very fast pace.
4.3.1.4

1LG fault replay attack
The 1LG fault replay attack attempts to emulate a valid fault by altering system

measurements to mimic a 1LG fault followed by sending an illicit trip command from a
compromised computer to relays at the ends of the transmission line. This attack may
lead to confusion and potentially cause an operator to take invalid control actions. A
Python script is used to initiate a Man-in-the-middle attack between the hardware PDC
and the historian that replays synchrophasor measurements from a valid 1LG fault then
replays commands to trip the relays on the affected line.
4.3.2

Test bed architecture
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BR2 BR3

L2
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3-bus 2-line transmission system for case study
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Hardware in the loop test bed

The HIL test bed shown in Figure 4.4 was used to simulate the distance protection
scheme on the 3-bus 2-line transmission system and implement the faults and cyberattacks scenarios. The RTDS was used to simulate transmission lines, breakers,
generators, and load. Four physical relays were wired to the RTDS in a HIL
configuration. The relays implemented a two-zone distance protection scheme. The relays
trip and open the breakers once a fault occurs on a transmission line. Fault logic for
different types of faults were created in RSCAD then the faults were implemented in the
RTDS. Prior to each implementation of a fault, the system load was randomized in the
range of 200-399MW. Each fault instance was implemented at a random location in 1%
increments from 10% to 90% of line L1.
The relays used in this work are the GE-D60 and SEL-421. Both are digital relays
with integrated PMU functionality. However, PMUs and relays were drawn separately in
Figure 4.4. The PMUs stream real-time synchrophasor measurement data, using the IEEE
C37.118 protocol at a rate of 120 samples per second, to the PDC. Then aggregated
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synchrophasor data is forwarded to the OpenPDC software. A python script processes the
synchrophasor measurement data received by OpenPDC into a comma separated values
format (CSV) file for each instance of a scenario. A row in the CSV file includes
readings of frequency, current phasors, voltage phasors, and sequence components from
the four PMUs, and a timestamp. Each CSV file is labeled with the instance number,
scenario name, as well as load ranges and/or fault location at the moment the instance of
the scenario occurs. The label is useful for grouping instances as will be discussed in
Section 4.4. The label is also used for training and classifier testing. The four relays were
sources of time stamped relay state changes. There is also a network event monitor that
logs any trip command packets sending to relays. All logs and synchrophasor
measurement CSV files were stored in a historian. The details of this test bed can be
found in [81] [82].
For this work, simulation of all scenarios starts from a stable state and ends at a
stable state. Faults last for one second and the relay closes the breaker 2 seconds after
opening. Also, the distance protection scheme was simplified by disabling reverse time
delay backup and limiting the number of protection zones for each relay to 2. Each relay
provides primary protection up to 80% of the line (Zone 1 protection) and backup
protection (Zone 2 protection) up to 150% of the line. The trip time for Zone 1 protection
is set to instantaneous while the trip time for the Zone 2 protection is set to 20 cycles.
4.3.3

Test Data and Data Preprocessing
In total 1,023 instances of 1LG faults, 274 instances of 2LG faults, 584 instances

of 3LG faults, 272 instances of LL faults, 274 instances of command injection attacks,
225 instances of aurora attack, and 703 instances of 1LG fault replay attack were
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simulated. Test data consists of the synchrophasor measurement CSV files, the four relay
logs and network event monitor logs collected during all of these scenarios. One relay log
is extracted from one of the relays, containing timestamp and corresponding events (trip
or not trip). Network event monitor log contains timestamp and corresponding network
events (trip command seen or not seen). Each CSV file contains tuples with 52
synchrophasor measurements as each PMU provides 13 measurements including voltage
and current phasor magnitude (Va, Vb, Vc and Ia, Ib, Ic), zero, positive and negative
sequence voltage and current phasor magnitude (V0, V1, V2 and I0, I1, I2) and apparent line
impedance (Z). A single CSV file has approximately 2,000 tuples for an instance of a
single scenario. Since the PMU stream at 120 samples per second, 2,000 tuples
corresponds to 17 seconds of simulated system time per scenario. The test data was
separated into training and testing data sets, each of which was the input to training and
testing phases of the classifier described in the previous section. The data preprocessing
step in the training and testing phases converts a data set into paths. This preprocessing
process constitutes following steps.
Step 1: Feature selection. Rather than using all recorded input features from the
dataset, only a portion of measurements was retained as selected features. In this work,
the selected features contain relay status and the three phases current magnitudes (Ia, Ib,
Ic). Relay status was used as features because all cyber-attacks studied in this work
maliciously trip relays via the network. The network event monitor log was selected as
one of the features for the same reason. The three phase current magnitudes were selected
because the current magnitudes of the three phases were the most significant
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measurements during symmetric and unsymmetrical faults. Other unselected
measurements were discarded from the input data.
Step 2: Quantizing features. Each feature was first quantized into finite ranges.
The quantization of features requires an expert’s domain knowledge. Continuous features
such as phase current for this case study were quantized into nominal ranges to create a
finite state space. The phase currents were quantized into low, normal, and high ranges.
The low range was 0-99 Amperes (A). The normal range was 100-1199 A. The high
range was greater than 1200 A. The relay status was quantized into two values; tripped
and not tripped. The network event monitor log was also quantized into two values; trip
command seen and trip command not seen.
Step 3: Merge quantized features into a measured events database. The
measurement data from the PMU and relay log were merged into a single measured
events database for one instance of a scenario. The PMU current magnitude
measurements were measured at 120 samples per second while relay status was updated
only on a relay state change. To merge the features phase current was chosen as a
reference and the relay status was up sampled prior to merging into the measured events
database.
The aggregated features with their quantized values in a single row of the
measured events database describe the system state at a given timestamp. A system state
thus is a vector of timestamps and features with quantized measurements. An example of
such state that describes relay R1 and R2 tripping due to high current magnitude can be
represented as a vector {Timestamp, IR1 = High, IR2 = High, R1 = Trip, R2 = Trip, …},
where “IR1 = High” and “IR2 = High” in the vector represent high current magnitudes
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measured by PMUs in R1 and R2. “R1 = Trip” and “R2 = Trip” in the vector represent
relay trip status of the two relays. Note that there will be other features with quantized
values in the vector but they are not displayed in this example. The time difference
between two states is same as that between two rows in the measured events database,
which is the reciprocal of the synchrophasor measurement rate; 1/120 samples per second
= 8.33 milliseconds (ms). The timestamps of rows in the measured events database are
normalized by subtracting the time of the first row from all other rows. This causes all
measured events databases to start from time 0.
Step 4: Mining paths from measured events databases. A path is mined from a
measured events database by first merging contiguous rows with unchanged state in the
measured events database. The remaining rows contain unique states. A state space
database is used to track the unique states. Each unique state is given a state identifier
(Sid). Rows are updated to include the state identifier of the system state with the time
stamp of the state.
Paths are an ordered list of states. Each instance of a scenario will have a path.
Many instances of a scenario will have unique paths due to system and measurement
dynamics. The paths mined from training data sets over fit the actual system behavior
they are intended to model. If raw paths are used for classification the classifier accuracy
will be low. Common paths are needed which represent the scenario across all variations
found in the training data set.
4.4

Evaluation
Three experiments were performed to validate the Mining Common Paths

algorithm. The first experiment classifies two classes, 1LG fault and command injection
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attack. To further stress the algorithm, we design the second experiment which performs
classification on different 1LG fault locations classes and command injection attack class.
The second experiment uses the same training data set and testing data set as experiment
1, but it requires an extra step in training in which system expertise is used to divide the
1LG fault class into multiple subclasses representing different fault locations. In
experiment 3, we tested the algorithm for 4 types of short-circuit faults and 3 types of
attacks. Experiment 3 uses 10-round cross validation to validate the correctness of the
classifier. Experiment 3 also includes a comparison of classification accuracy using
different PMU streaming rates. The training phase and test phase used for each
experiment are summarized as follows.
4.4.1

Training phase:

Input: Training data set for NTraining instances of M classes (each class associates with
one scenario)
Output: M sets of common paths (cp) for M classes
Step 1: Training data set is preprocessed into NTraining paths as stated in Section IV.C for
NTraining instances.
Step 2: NTraining paths are grouped into M groups for M classes.
Step 3: Common paths are computed for each group of paths.
4.4.2

Test phase:

Input: Test data set for NTest instances of M classes
Output: Classify instance by scenario type
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Step 1: For each instance in test data set, preprocess instance into one path under test
(PUTj).
Step 2: Compare the path to all common paths in cp by repeating Step 3 for each cpi in
cp.
Step 3: If cpi ⊆ PUTj then cpi is a candidate common path.
Step 4: The PUTi is classified as class of the maximal length candidate common path. If
more than one maximal candidate common path are maximal then PUTi is classified as
unknown.
Step 5: If PUTi is classified as none of the known classes, then it is marked as unknown.
Step 6: Repeat Step 1 to Step 5 for all NTesting instances.
4.4.3

Experiment 1
For the first experiment, approximately half of the test data for 1LG fault and

command injection attack is randomly chosen as training data set while the rest is used as
a testing data set. This resulted in 519 instances of 1LG fault and 127 instances of the
command injection attack which were used for training. Table 4.2 is a confusion matrix
for experiment 1.
For this work, accuracy, misclassification, and unknown rates were defined as
follows. The accuracy rate is the percentage of instances correctly classified.
Misclassification rate is the percentage of the instances of a class which were
misclassified as another scenario. The unknown rate is percentage of the instances of a
scenario which were not classified as any scenario. Unknown instances either match no
common paths or match more than one common path from more than one class.
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Table 4.2

Confusion matrix for experiment 1
Fault
491
0
28

Fault
C. Inj.
Unknown

C. Inj.
0
123
4

For the first experiment, the overall classification accuracy was 95%. No
instances were misclassified. A total of 5% of tested scenario instances were unknown.
All unknown instances matched at least one fault and at least one command injection
common path.
There were a total of 221 common paths found for the two scenarios; 203 for 1LG
fault scenario and 18 for the command injection scenario. This high number of paths
results from the dynamic nature of the power system. Figure 4.5 is a plot of the fault
location, from the perspective of relay R1, versus relay trip times for relays R1 and R2.
Figure 4.5 clearly shows zone 1 and zone 2 trip boundaries for both relays. Additionally,
Figure 4.5 shows that the relay trip times vary with fault location especially in the fault
location region from 24-79% of the transmission line. The large number of common
paths for the 1LG fault injection scenario is primarily due to this variation. System
behavior also varies as the system load changes. Behavior changes due to system lead to
multiple common paths being found for both the 1LG fault and command injection
scenarios.
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Experiment 2
Ideally, faults between 0-20% of the transmission line should have instant trip

time for relay R1 and trip after 20 cycles for relay R2. Faults between 80-100% of the
transmission line should trip after 20 cycles for relay R1 and instantly for relay R2. In the
21-79% range both relays should ideally trip instantly. Observed trip times match the
ideal case for the 0-20% and 80-100% ranges. Note, the apparent impedance setting for
zone 2 for relay R2 causes the zone 1 to zone 2 transition to occur at approximately 23%
of the line (77% of the line from relay R2’s perspective) instead of at the expected 20%
of the line (80% of the line from relay R2’s perspective).
The trip times from 24-80% of the line are always instantaneous. Observed trip
times tended to increase as the fault approached the zone 1 to zone 2 boundary points. To
compensate for this observed behavior the 1LG fault paths were grouped by fault location
per the following groups; (10-23%, 24-29%, 30-35%, 36-40%, 41-60%, 61-65%, 6670%, 71-80%, 81-90%). Additionally, it was observed that trip times partially correlated
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to the system load. As a result, the 1LG fault class used in experiment 1 is divided into
multiple classes by fault location and load. Four load ranges were used; (200-249, 250399, 300-349, 350-399 MW). This subdivided the 1LG fault class into 9*4 = 36 sub
classes.
The command injection attack class in experiment 1 was also divided using 4 load
ranges, which results in 4 command injection attack classes.
The extra step of subdividing the 1LG fault class and command injection attack
results in a total of 40 classes, i.e. M = 40 in the training phase of the classifier. The
training data set and testing data set in this experiment is the same as that used in
experiment 1.
Table 4.3

Confusion matrix for experiment 2

10-23%
23-29%
30-35%
36-40%
41-60%
61-65%
65-70%
71-80%
81-90%
C. Inj.
Unk. Fault
Unknown

10- 23- 30- 36- 41- 61- 65- 71- 81C.
23% 29% 35% 40% 60% 64% 70% 80% 90% Inj.
191
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
4
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
4
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
7
0
2
6
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
41
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
5
10
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
8
3
14
4
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
38
18
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
135
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
127
0
0
9
7
0
0
0
0
0
0
4
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0

Table 4.3 is a confusion matrix for all scenarios for experiment 2. As previously
mentioned, the 1LG fault classes were divided by fault location and system load. To save
space the groups in the confusion matrix were combined to just show the fault location
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classes and one command injection class. An extra row (marked Unk. for unknown) was
added to the confusion matrix to show instances of scenarios which were not classified.
The experiment 2 classification accuracy, misclassification, and unknown rates
can be viewed from multiple perspectives. The overall accuracy rate for the groups
shown in the confusion matrix was 87.6%. Misclassification and unknown rates for the
same groups were 9.1% and 3.3% respectively. From the confusion matrix the majority
of misclassification occurred when 1LG fault groups were classified as members of a
neighboring or nearby fault group. The unknown cases are separated into unknown
instances which resulted from an instance matching multiple fault common paths (“Unk.
Fault” in Table 4.3) and unknown instances which matched no common path. The 16
cases of faults which matched common paths from more than one group all occurred
because both the (30-35%) and (36-40%) shared a common path.
The intent of subdividing the 1LG fault class was not to classify 1LG faults by a
specific fault location. Correctly classifying a fault as a fault is sufficient as many
algorithms are available to provide fault location information. The accuracy rate when the
fault location classes were combined into a single class is 96.7%. The misclassification
rate was 0% and the unknown rate was 3.3%.
Common paths can be mapped into two-dimensional coordinates with the Y-axis
indicating the state identification code (state ID) and the X-axis indicating normalized
timestamps. An edge between two vertices represents the temporal transition between
two states. Each vertex is marked with state information. shows common paths for two
scenarios, a fault in the 36-40% fault location group and a command injection attack.
The fault and command injection common paths both start at the system normal state.
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These paths differ immediately because for faults the PMU will measure high current
when a fault is present. This makes the second state of the fault common path high
current detected at relay R1. The command injection attack occurs when there is no fault
present. As such, the second state for the command injection attack has normal current at
both relays while both relay’s status indicates a trip.
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Figure 4.6 shows common paths for two different 1LG fault locations. Note that
not all features are displayed in the graph. The 10-23% fault is in relay R2 zone 2 and the
24-29% fault is in relay R2 zone 1. This difference is the primary reason for different
paths for the two fault sub groups.
Figure 4.7 demonstrate that common paths contain the critical states for different
scenarios. The primary contribution of the mining common paths algorithm is the ability
to create unique paths for each scenario type.
Training and testing processing time and memory usage were measured using an
Ubuntu Linux Virtual Machine with 3.5GHZ CPU and 2GB memory. For experiment 1,
training required 202 seconds and 25.3 MB memory. Experiment 1 testing required 550
seconds to complete and 25.3 MB of memory. For experiment 2, training required 205
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seconds and 25.2 megabytes (MB) memory. Experiment 2 testing required 540 seconds
to complete and 25.2 MB of memory.
4.4.5

Experiment 3
A third experiment was conducted for classifying 4 types of symmetric and

unsymmetrical faults and 3 types of cyber-attacks. The training phase used the same
methodology as experiments 1 and 2. Validation in this experiment used10-round cross
validation. In each round, half of the test data was randomly chosen as a training dataset
and the remaining data was used as the testing data set. Table 4.4 is a combined
confusion matrix for 10 rounds of validation for the 1LG, 2LG, 3LG, LL faults,
command injection, Aurora, and fault replay attacks. Each entry in the table sums up
numbers for 10 rounds in the corresponding location.

Table 4.4

Confusion Matrix for 4 types of faults and 3 cyber-attacks
1LG
Flt.
1LG Flt. 5009
2LG Flt.
6
3LG Flt.
86
LL Flt.
0
Cmd. Inj.
0
Aurora
0
Flt. Replay 0
Unknown 177

2LG
Flt.

3LG
Flt.

0
0
1248
0
11 2905
14
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
58
15

Flt.
Cmd. Auror
Repla
Inj.
a
y
3
0
0
109
0
0
0
0
24
0
0
17
1089
0
0
0
6
1380
0
124
0
0
971
0
0
0
0
3138
238
0
159
97
LL
Flt.

The total number of classifications made in Table 4 is 16,851, of which 15,740
instances are correctly classified. The average accuracy for the seven classes shown in
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Table 4 is 93.41%. Only 488 instances of faults (177 of 1LG fault, 58 of 2LG fault, and
15 of 3LG fault and 238 for LL) were classified as unknown. And only 6 instances of
faults are misclassified as cyber-attacks. The lowest accuracy for an individual class or
scenario type was for fault replay attacks. Fault replay attack classification accuracy was
90%. Fault replay attacks were misclassified as a fault for 3.6% of the tested instances
and misclassified as a command injection attack for 3.5% of tested instances. The fault
replay attack is intended to mimic a 1LG fault and as such is sometimes able to confuse
the classifier. The fault replay includes elements from the command injection attack. This
leads to similarities which cause occasional misclassification as a command injection
attack. Table 4 demonstrates that the classifier is able to distinguish faults and cyberattacks.
The accuracy rate for 10-round validation when the PMU is sample rate at 20, 30,
60, and 120 Hertz (Hz) is plotted in Figure 4.8. Classification accuracy is higher when the
PMU is streaming at 120 Hz and lowest at 20 Hz. This is reasonable as higher PMU
samples rates gives better visibility of the system states when fast moving events, such as
faults, are considered.
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Conclusions
The mining common paths algorithm creates common paths from heterogenerous

data in the power system. A common path represents a set of critical states that a system
will step through in temporal order for a scenario such as a disturbance or a cyber-attack.
Common paths can be used as signatures to classify power system behaviors with high
specificity. Such a classifier is a useful tool for use with automated system integrity
protection systems and wide area control systems which include responses for both
natural, equipment failure, and cyber-attack related contingiencies.
Simple paths can be derived from monitored instances of sceanrios applied to a
test bed. However, the transients present in time-domain measurement data lead to
different paths for different instances of the same scenario. The mining common paths
algorithm uses a sequential pattern mining approach to overcome this challenge and
common paths for the scenario.
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To validate the correctness of the algorithm, a case study was performed which
applied the mining common paths algorithm and classifier to detect disturbances and
cyber-attacks. The classifier provides a capability to accurately distinguish between
different types of power system faults and cyber-attacks including command injection,
aurora attacks and fault replay attacks. Three separate experiments were performed. The
first experiment applied the mining common paths algorithm to data with 2 classes; 1LG
fault and command injection. The second experiment adds an extra step prior to the
training phase where the 1LG fault class is divided into a number of subclasses by taking
advanatage of power system domain expertise. The extra step of sub-dividing classes in
training produces slightly better accuracy, misclassification, and unknown classification.
Both experiments required similar training time, testing time, and memory usage. A third
experiment was conducted using the same training as experiment 2. Ten round cross
validation was performed with varying PMU sample rates. The ten round validation
shows the classifier has not overfit the data. Comparison of varying PMU sample rates
shows the highest accuracy is achieved with PMU sampled in 120 Hz. This is expected
since faults are fast moving events and 120 Hz sample rate provides the most visibility of
system state changes.
This work demonstrates a methodology to leverage synchrophasor measurements
for power system disturbance and cyber-attack detecion and highlights the promise of the
minining common paths aglorithm.
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CHAPTER V
DEVELOPING A HYBRID INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM USING DATA
MINING FOR POWER SYSTEM

5.1

Introduction
The next generation power system, also known as smart grid, will rely on

advanced technologies such as synchrophasor systems for wide area monitoring and
control in order to meet the increasing demand of reliable energy. While in the past,
power system components were isolated, they are now interconnected via information
infrastructure e.g. Ethernet, and therefore are under the threat of cyber-attacks. Due to the
critical role that the power system plays in our society, there is a common agreement that
the electric power grid needs to be better secured to ensure continually available power
for the nation [1]. There have been multiple documents from different organizations
which provide recommendations and guidelines for industry to better secure their
facilities[2][3]. However, the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO)
has realized that current guidelines are not sufficient to securely implement the smart grid
and calls for research and development to improve upon current security mechanisms [4].
Intrusion detection is a process which identifies activities that violate the security
policy in a computer system or network. Intrusion detection is a necessary complement to
preventive mechanisms such as firewalls because intrusion detection has the ability to
detect attacks that exploit system design flaws or bugs and to help people understand the
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cause of attacks and thus take proper reactions [7]. The increasing coupling of cyber
infrastructure and physical devices of the smart grid makes a traditional host-based
intrusion detection system (IDS) inadequate because host-based IDS only monitor one
location or one host in the system while power system control algorithms such as the
distance protection scheme usually involve multiple devices at multiple locations.
Therefore, new IDS should have the ability to take multiple data sources into account and
perform stateful monitoring at the system level. Manually building a stateful system level
IDS is a knowledge-intensive task which requires vulnerability analysis and manual
creation of rules and patterns which describe attacks, system specification, or system
normal behaviors. The manual development process results in limited scalability and
updates are slow and expensive.
This chapter documents a systematic and automated approach to building a hybrid
IDS that leverages features of signature-based and specification-based IDS. The IDS
classifies system behaviors over time as specific disturbances, normal control operations,
and cyber-attacks. Sequence of critical states, called common path, provide a
specification or signature for each scenario. A fundamental ingredient of the IDS
presented in this chapter is a data mining technique that aggregates synchrophasor
measurement data and audit logs from multiple system devices to learn the common
paths. The automatic approach eliminates the need to manually analyze and hand-code
patterns and is able to handle very large amounts of data. A case study is included to
demonstrate that the proposed IDS provides high detection accuracy for both known and
unknown scenarios and thus is suitable for a mission-critical environments such as power
systems.
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Common paths are signatures of events present in a training database. Common
paths are also specifications since they describe expected system behaviors related to
known scenarios; normal expected system behaviors and cyber-attacks behaviors. The
IDS matches a temporal set of monitored system states to common paths, a signature
based technique, to make a classification. Behaviors which do not match a common path
are considered unspecified events and are either zero day attacks or unknown system
behaviors.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The mining common path
algorithm is reviewed in Section 5.2. The overview of the test bed and simulated power
system scenarios are presented in Section 5.3. Section 5.4 introduces the procedures to
construct the proposed IDS. Experiments and results are discussed in Section 5.5.
Conclusions and future work are provided in Section 5.6.
5.2

Mining common paths
A state is used to represent a system’s instantaneous status. A state consists of a

set of observed system measurements or features f as well as a normalized time stamp
TS, i.e. S = {TS, f1,⋯,fn}. The value of a feature is read from a sensor. The possible
values for a feature are in a range called its domain. A feature that has continuous values
in its domain should be discretized to finite ranges to avoid an infinite state space.
A path P is a list of observed system states arranged in temporal order according
to their timestamps, namely Pi = {S1, S2, …, Sn}, ordered by increasing time. A sequence
s is a subset of a path, i.e. s ⊆ P. We denote a sequence s by {Si+1, Si+2, …, Si+m}. A path
P contains sequence s if all of the elements in s appear in P in the same order. In a set of
sequences, a sequence is maximal if the sequence is not contained in any other sequences.
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Let G be the set of all observed paths for a scenario Q so G = {P1, P2,…,Pn}
where n is the number of observed paths for Q. A path supports sequence s if the
sequence is contained in the path. Support can be defined as a metric in which the support
of sequence s is the percentage of paths in G that contain sequence s.
A common path for scenario Q is any sequence whose support is greater than a
minimum support threshold and is maximal. There may be multiple common paths for a
single scenario. Common paths reflect the states that occur most frequently for a
scenario. The process of mining common path is similar to mining frequent sequence
patterns as defined in [31].
Table 5.1

Example paths for a scenario
T1

T2

T3

T4

T5

P1

S1

S2

S3

S4

S5

P2

S1

S2

S3

S4

S5

Delayed States

P3

S1

S10

S2

S3

S4

S5

Extra States

P4

S1

S11

S12

S4

S5

Modified States

P5

S21

S22

S23

S24

S25

Error Path

Example

T6
Ideal Case

Consider the set of paths shown in Table 5.1. For the example G =

{P1, P2, P3, P4, P5}. If the minimum support threshold is set to 60%, the set of
sequences in G which meet the minimum support threshold includes {S1, S2, S3, S4, S5},
{S1, S3, S4, S5} and {S1, S4, S5}. For this example, {S1, S2, S3, S4, S5} is maximal and is
therefore the common path. The sequences {S1, S3, S4, S5} and {S1, S4, S5} are not
maximal because they are contained in {S1, S2, S3, S4, S5}. Alternatively, if the minimum
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support threshold is changed to 70%, the set of sequences in G which meet the minimum
support threshold includes only {S1, S4, S5}. Since {S1, S4, S5} meets the threshold in this
case, it is maximal and is a common path.
Table 5.1 also provides examples of possible types of paths that could be found in
the dataset. P1 represents the ideal case for a path representing a scenario. P2 matches P1
except a subset of states are delayed. This may occur due to a measurement error or due
to power system dynamics. P3 contains an extra state. Dynamics may occur when a
feature oscillates during a state transition. P4 represents the case when a path is similar
but a state is different from the ideal case. This could happen when an event that should
have occurred at T2 occurs at T3 instead, which mangles states S2 and S3 (they change to
S11, S12). P5 represents an error path. In the error path no sequences match the ultimate
common path.
The common path is used as a specification during classification. Changing the
minimum support threshold changes the number of states in a common path and can
affect classification accuracy. It is not necessary to find a common path which matches
the ideal path, rather the goal is to find a common path which is unique for a scenario and
which leads to maximum classification accuracy. For a noisy system a shorter common
path may yield better classification results.
A common path for a single line to ground (SLG) fault should have a sequence of
critical states representing “current going high”, “relay trip” and “current falling to zero.”
The ability to find a common path is greatly dependent on the quality of paths in G. For
example; if there are a many error paths in G it will be difficult to find sequences which
meet the minimum support threshold.
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Classification is performed by comparing observed system states to the states of
known common paths. The path under test (PUT) is compared to all common paths. If
cpi ⊆ PUT then cpi is a candidate common path. The PUT is classified as matching the
scenario of the maximal candidate common path from the set of candidate common paths.
If more than one candidate common path are maximal the PUT is classified as unknown.
The rest of this chapter presents a case study which applies the mining common
path algorithm to a 3-bus 2-line transmission system for classifying 25 power system
scenarios.
5.3

Test bed architecture

5.3.1

Distance protection for transmission lines
Zone 2
Zone 1

BR1

L1

BR2 BR3

L2

BR4

G1

G2

R1

R2

R3

B1

R4
LOAD

B3

B2

Figure 5.1

Distance protection scheme in a 3-bus 2-line transmission system
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Figure 5.2

Electric transmission system test bed

The distance protection scheme is the most popular scheme for protecting
transmission lines. The principle of operation recognizes that the impedance of a highvoltage transmission line is approximately proportional to its length. This means the
impedance “seen” by the relay during a fault is proportional to the distance between the
point of fault and the relay. Distance relays are encoded with multiple protection zones.
Each zone is assigned an apparent impedance threshold and a trip time. Relays have over
lapping protection zones to provide system protection redundancy. One relay’s Zone 1 is
part of another relay’s Zone 2 and so forth. For this case study, the distance protection
scheme was simplified by disabling reverse time delay backup and limiting the number of
protection zones for each relay to 2. Figure 5.1 shows a 3-bus 2-line transmission system
that is modified from IEEE 4-bus 3-generator system . Relay R1’s zones 1 and 2 are
shown as dashed line boxes. Each relay provides primary protection up to 80% of the line
(Zone 1 protection) and backup protection (Zone 2 protection) up to 150% of the line in
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case that the primary protection fails. The trip time for Zone 1 protection is configured to
be instantaneous while the trip time for the Zone 2 protection is time-delayed to avoid
false tripping unless the primary relay fails.
5.3.2

Test bed architecture
The hardware-in-the-loop test bed shown in Figure 5.2 was used to simulate the

distance protection scheme on the 3-bus 2-line transmission system and to implement 25
power system disturbance, control action, and cyber attack scenarios. The RTDS was
used simulate transmission lines, breakers, generators, and load. Four physical relays
were wired to the RTDS in a hardware-in-the-loop configuration. The relays
implemented the two zone distance protection scheme. The relays trip and open the
breakers when a fault occurs on a transmission line. All relays included integrated PMU
functionality to measure power system transmission line state; however, the PMU(s) were
drawn separately in the graph because relays are controlled by Modbus/TCP and PMUs
stream synchrophasor measurements using the IEEE C37.118 protocol. The PMU(s)
streamed real-time synchrophasor measurement data at a rate of 120 samples per second,
to the PDC which aggregate network frames from multiple PMU and forward the
aggregated synchrophasor frames to the OpenPDC software. A python script processes
the synchrophasor measurement data received by OpenPDC into a comma separated file.
The synchrophasor measurement data includes readings of frequency, current phasors,
voltage phasors, and sequence components. The four relays were sources of time stamped
relay state changes. The signature-based intrusion detection system Snort runs on a PC to
detect network activities. Snort provides alerts when it detects remote tripping command
activities in the network. Snort, by itself, cannot distinguish between legitimate and
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illegitimate remote trip commands since they appear the same on the network. A control
panel computer simulates energy management system (EMS) functionality. The EMS
simulation was used to disconnect a transmission line for maintenance by remotely
tripping relays via a MODBUS/TCP network packet. An EMS log provides the
timestamp of such a line maintenance event. For this work, it is assumed that an attacker
computer has successfully penetrated the utility’s operational network and can launch
cyber-attacks from a node on the operational network. Scenarios of power system
disturbances, normal operations and power system cyber-attacks are applied against the
simulated power system and its components. Data logs were captured from the
synchrophasor system, relays, Snort, and the simulated EMS. All data logs were time
stamped and logged events were labeled with the name of the scenario being simulated.
5.3.3

Test bed scenarios
The power system scenarios used to train and validate the IDS presented in this

chapter have been grouped into three categories; power system single-line-to-ground
faults, normal operations, and cyber-attacks. Each category is described in this section
with details. There are a total 25 scenarios each named with capital “Q” along with a
number. The system load was randomized at the beginning of each scenario. Power
system SLG faults belong to the shunt fault family and account for up to 70% of faults in
a power system [23]. For this work, only phase-a-to-ground faults were simulated as each
phase to ground fault has similar characteristics. The phase-a-to-ground fault is
abbreviated as “fault” in the rest of this chapter. There are 2 SLG fault scenarios as
named Q1 and Q2 that simulate faults on one of the two transmission lines. Each fault
instance was implemented at a random location in 1% increments from 10% to 90% of
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the corresponding transmission line. Faults were simulated for 1 second afterwhich an
automatic reclosing algorithm restored the transmission line to service.
The transmission line maintenance scenario simulates the situation when an
operator remotely trips relays to open breakers at both ends of a transmission line to take
the line out of service for line maintenance. The operator initiated remote trip commands
are recorded and time stamped in the control panel log. Two scenarios of this type, Q5
and Q6, were implemented, one for each of the two transmission lines.
Power system cyber-attacks may originate from insiders, amateur hackers,
political activists, criminal organizations, governments, and terrorists. Cyber-attacks may
appear as a nuisance or may bring the system to collapse [24]. Attacks can be carried out
from within power system substations, control center, transmission and distribution
infrastructures by exploiting weaknesses in physical security policies. Alternatively,
attacks may take advantage of security flaws and vulnerabilities in software, devices,
communication infrastructures, and protocols to electronically infiltrate power system
operational networks. Three types of attacks are simulated; relay trip command injection;
disabling relay function; SLG fault replay.
Relay trip command injection attacks create contingencies by sending unexpected
relay trip commands remotely from an attacker’s computer to the relays at the ends of the
two transmission lines. The trip command injection attack used for this work closely
mimics the line maintenance scenario. The malicious trip command originates from
another node on the communications network with a spoofed legitimate IP address. Since
the attack is not from the control panel computer there will not be no record in the control
panel log, however, the Snort network traffic monitor will detect this remote trip
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command. There are 6 scenarios of this type of attack targeting either one relay (Q7, Q8,
Q9, Q10), or two relays at the same time (Q11, Q12).
The disabled relay attack mimics the effects of insiders taking illicit control
actions or malware taking control of software systems to manipulate control devices. A
python script accesses a relay’s internal registers via MODBUS/TCP commands sent
from the attacker’s computer which modify the relevant relay settings. A total of 12
scenarios of this attack are simulated in the test bed. There are 6 scenarios that disable
one or two relays which cause the relay not to operate when a valid fault occurs (Q13,
Q14, Q15, Q16, Q21, Q22). Another 6 scenarios disable one or two relays to interrupt
line maintenance operation by disabling relay tripping function and causing the breakers
not to open (Q17, Q18, Q19, Q20, Q23, Q24).
The SLG fault replay attack attempts to emulate a valid fault by altering system
measurements followed by sending an illicit trip command to relays at the ends of the
transmission line. This attack may lead to confusion and potentially cause an operator to
take invalid control actions. A Python script is used to initiate a Man-in-the-middle
(MITM) attack between the hardware PDC and the historian computer. The attack
replays synchrophasor measurements from a valid single line to ground fault then replays
commands to trip the relays on the affected line. There are 2 scenarios of this type of
attack simulating relay faults at one of the two transmission lines (Q3 and Q4).
The final scenario, Q25, represents a stable system state. For this scenario the load
may change, but, no other attacks, disturbances, or control actions are simulated.
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All scenarios start and end with the system in a stable state. As such, all faults are
cleared, transmission lines taken out of service for maintenance are returned to service,
and all attacks end.
5.3.4

Scenario implementation
Figure 5.3 shows control flow between test bed components. The intention of this

design is to simulate large numbers of scenarios in random order with random test bed
parameters such as load level and fault locations. The AutoIT script controls different
scripts for the implementation of different scenarios as shown in the dash line box in the
top right corner.

Auto IT script
Simulation Environment

Log Retrieving
Script

Attack Script

E.g.MITM,
DOS

RTDS

Matlab Sript

E.g. Faults

Relay/PMU

Control
Panel Scirpt

E.g. Normal
Opertions

PDC

Synchrophasor Data
retreiving Script

Relay Log

Figure 5.3

Synchrophasor
Measurement Data

Control Panel Log

Control flow for automation scenario implementation and data collections
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There are a couple of attack scripts that are developed in Python, which
implements different cyber-attacks in the test bed. For example, the command injection
attack script to remotely trip a relay sends a Modbus trip command to relays. The SLG
fault replay attack script sets up a man-in-the-middle attack using Ettercap, then alters
PMU data in flight, and finally trips the relays to imitate a legal relay trip.
Line maintenance scenarios are also implemented using Python scripts, however,
while sending the trip command to relays, they will also put an entry in the control panel
log indicating the legality of this action. Single line to ground faults are simulated using a
Matlab routine which triggers a SLG fault on target line locations in RTDS. Either line
from Figure 5.1 will be taken out of service.
The disabled relay attack requires coordination between different scripts. First, an
attack script sends a “relay function OFF” command via Modbus to the target relay.
Second, the Matlab instructs the RTDS to execute the proscribed SLG fault. This
coordination is done by the master AutoIT script invoking the two scripts in the specified
order.
The master AutoIT script will call each script with randomized parameters in
random order at random times. Randomized parameters will include the relay targets,
system load level, and fault location where appropriate. The master script will also
include relatively long periods of normal operation.
With this test bed, the implementations of a large number of scenarios can be
easily scheduled through the AutoIT script. Each implementation is also configured to
run with random test bed parameters to simulate real world power system. The
parameters are fed to different scripts as arguments. For example, load level and fault
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location are two arguments to the Matlab routine, the values of which result in SLG fault
at a specified load level and fault location. After each implementation, relay logs, control
panel logs and synchrophasor measurement data can be collected from the output of log
retrieving script, synchrophasor data retrieving script and control panel script. The data
then will be marked with corresponding scenario number.
The test bed also facilitates the implementation of new scenarios. New scenarios
can be developed in scripts with interfaces that are callable by the master AutoIT scripts.
5.3.5

Test data
Test data used for this work includes data logs associated with 10,000 simulated

instances of the 25 aforementioned scenarios. The data log is a comma separated file with
labeled tuples that include 56 sensor measurements and a timestamp. The 56 data
sources consist of 52 synchrophasor measurements; 13 from each relay location on
Figure 5.1. The synchrophasor data from a single relay consists of phase a voltage and
current phasor magnitude (Va, Vb, Vc and Ia, Ib, Ic), zero, positive and negative sequence
voltage and current phasor magnitude (V0, V+, V- and I0, I+, I-) and apparent line
impedance (Z). The synchrophasor data was sampled at 120 times per second. Relay
status information, breaker events, Snort alerts, and control panel alerts were also logged.
All logged data was merged into a single dataset.
An instance of a single scenario is represented by approximately 2,000 tuples in
the test data set. This corresponds to approximately 17 seconds of simulated system time
per scenario. In total the test data has more than 2 million tuples. Each tuple in the test
data is labeled. Approximately half of the test data was used to train the classifier and
half was used to test classification accuracy.
117

For this work, 15 features were used; phase current magnitude measured at each
relay, relay status for each relay, snort alert status for each relay, and control panel
remote trip status.
5.4

Training the IDS
This section documents the IDS construction process. An overview of the IDS

construction process is shown in Figure 5.4. The data formatting step converts input data
logs to a measured events database (MED). Next, the specification learning steps process
the MED to learn common paths, a unique set of system states in temporal order, for each
labeled scenario. Finally, a graph is constructed which includes common paths for all
scenarios.
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Figure 5.4

5.4.1

4. Graph
Construction

2. Creating and Grouping Paths

Intrusion detection system training process

Data Formatting
The first step of the data formatting process is feature quantization. Feature

quantization requires domain expertise. Features with values which can take continuous
values are mapped into finite ranges to limit state space size. Features which take discrete
values are generally left unchanged unless the number of discrete values is large.
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The phase current measurement is a real number and therefore should be grouped
into discrete ranges. Phase current magnitude was separated into normal and high ranges.
The normal range was 0-1199 Amperes (A). The high range was all values greater than or
equal to 1200 A. The relay status, snort alert, and control panel remote trip status features
are all binary. Possible relay status values are tripped and not tripped. Possible Snort
alert status values are alert and no alert. Possible control panel remote trip status values
are tripped and not tripped.
The MED is a merged compressed data set with quantized features. Data from
sensors with lower sample rates is up sampled to match the sampling rate of the sensor
with the highest sampling rate. The up sampling process depends upon the sensor type.
Continuously sampled sensors update their value at each sample period based upon the
current measured state. The current magnitude and relay status are continuously sampled.
Event based sensors provide a single message when a state change occurs. The snort
alert and control panel remote trip status features are event based. For each, when the
sensor detects the presence of an event the sensor provides a message indicating the event
occurred. In a data log a continuously sampled sensor measurement takes a value and
holds that value across multiple samples until the state changes. Conversely, in the data
log event based features are asserted for a single sample for each measured event.
When up sampling, continuously sampled sensor measurements are mapped to the
nearest sample period after the measurement. All samples without a value take the value
nearest proceeding sample. Event based sensor measurements are also mapped to the
nearest sample period after the measurement. All samples without a value take the non
asserted value. For this work, the current magnitude measurements were measured at 120
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samples per second which is the highest sampling rate of all features. Relay status, snort
alerts, and control panel log features were up sampled according to the aforementioned
procedure.
An MED represents one instance of a scenario. As such, data formatting requires
copying each scenario into a separate file. The timestamps of rows in the MED are
normalized by subtracting the time of the first row from all other rows. This causes all
measured events databases to start from time 0.
5.4.2

Creating and grouping paths

5.4.2.1

Creating paths
A path is a list of observed system states arranged in temporal order. Mining paths

is performed by down sampling the MED while preserving all state transitions. A state
change is a change on any sensor value between two MED samples. The MED is parsed
to identify all periods of consistent state. Consistent state periods are down sampled using
a user defined sample period. For this work, the sample period was 0.5 seconds. Each
unique state is assigned a state identifier (Sid) and all known states are stored in a state
data base.
A path is mined for each MED. A single scenario will have many unique paths
due to the dynamic nature of power systems, variations in the order of states within a
path, and due to variations in event timing. Using the paths derived from the mining
paths process for classification results in poor classification accuracy. The mining
common paths algorithm is used to shrink the larger group of paths into a representative
set of common paths which represent normal variation and serve as a set of signatures for
each scenario.
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5.4.2.2

Error features
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Figure 5.5
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Dispersion of timestamps for three states that contain three events CP = R1,
SNT = R1 and IR1 = 0.

There will be situation where a feature (or more features) used to construct MED
has big deviation in its timestamps due to transmission delay or tight computational
resources of a computer. This causes the paths created from the MED merging step to be
inaccurate. We call such feature “error feature”. Figure 5.5 shows timestamps of three
states from left to right that contain event “control panel sending trip command to relay
R1” (CP = R1), event “snort detecting trip command to R1” (SNT = R1) and event
“current measured by R1 dropping to zero” (IR1 = 0) respectively. The most left box plot
shows that feature “control panel log” is an error feature because the timestamps of “CP
= R1” present wide dispersion over a number of instances. This will result in the failure
in mining a common path. To deal with “error features”, we design an error feature
sensor which correct the timestamps of the error feature. The error feature sensor first
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excludes the error feature from the MED before merging rows in MED. After merging
rows, it adds the feature back to the first state of each path. For example, if a scheduled
trip command to R1 is seen in the control panel log for the scenario that the path
represents then CP = R1 is added to the first state of the path, otherwise, CP = 0 will be
added.
5.4.2.3

Grouping paths
Grouping is an optional step which preprocesses input data to separate large

classes into smaller sub-classes. Grouping can lead to more accurate classification when
the sub-classes are sufficiently different from one another.
Figure 5.6 clearly shows zone 1 and zone 2 trip boundaries for both relays.
Additionally, Figure 5.6 shows that the relay trip times vary with fault location especially
in the fault location region from 24-79% of the transmission line. System behavior also
varies as the system load changes.
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Ideally, instances of SLG fault at transmission line L1 scenarios (i.e. Q1) from a
two zone distance protection scheme can be separated into 3 groups according to the area
of the line in which the fault occurs. Group 1 includes faults from the length of the line
which is protected by relay R1’s zone 1 and relay R2’s zone 2. From Figure 5.6, group 1
includes faults which occur between 10-23% of the line. For group 1 faults, relay R1
should trip instantly and R2 should trip after 0.4 seconds. Group 2 includes faults
protected by relay R1’s and R2’s zone 1. Both relays should trip instantly for group 2
faults. From Figure 5.6, group 2 faults occur between 24-79% of the line. Group 3
includes faults protected by relay R1’s zone 2 and relay R2’s zone 1. Relay R1 should
trip after 20 cycles and R2 should trip instantly for group 3 faults. From Figure 5.6, group
3 faults occur between 80-90% of the line.
Observed trip times in group 2 tended to increase as the fault approached the zone
1 to zone 2 boundary points. To compensate for this observed behavior the SLG fault
paths were grouped by fault location per the following groups; (10-23%, 24-29%, 3035%, 36-40%, 41-60%, 61-65%, 66-70%, 71-80%, 81-90%). Additionally, it was
observed that trip times partially correlated to the system load. As a result, the SLG fault
paths were grouped by fault location and load. Four load ranges were used; (200-249,
250-399, 300-349, 350-399 MW). This grouping subdivided the SLG fault paths into
9*4 = 36 sub-groups.
5.4.3

Mining common paths

The mining paths step produced 5000 paths from 5000 instances of the 25 scenarios. The
mining common path algorithm produced 477 common paths. The minimum and
maximum number of common paths for a single scenario was 4 and 53 respectively. The
123

15 SLG fault scenarios had 421 common paths spread among them. The remaining 10
scenarios had 56 common paths. The large number of common paths for the SGL faults is
due to the large variation in relay trip times as fault location and system load varies.
Common paths can be mapped into two-dimensional coordinates with the Y-axis
indicating the state identification code (state ID) and the X-axis indicating normalized
timestamps. An edge between two vertices represents the temporal transition between
two states. Each vertex is marked with state information. Note that only necessary
features are displayed to save space. Figure 5.7 shows common paths for two scenarios, a
fault in the 36-40% fault location of line L1 and a fault replay attack on line L1. The
fault and fault replay paths both start at the system normal state. For real faults, the PMU
will measure high current when a fault is present while for a fake fault the attacker injects
high current measurement to the PMU. This makes the second state of the both common
paths high current detected at relay R1, i.e. IR1 = High. However, these paths differ
immediately because for the fault replay, the attacker has to inject relay trip commands to
relay R1 and R2 at the same time. As such, the second state for the fault replay attack has
the trip commands to R1 and R2 detected by Snort, i.e. SNT = (R1, R2) in Figure 5.7.
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Figure 5.8 shows common paths for line maintenance and command injection
attack scenarios. The primary difference between the two scenarios is the command to
open relays R1 and R2 originates from the control panel computer for the line
maintenance scenario. This causes the control panel log to include a trip command
message. The common path for the line maintenance scenario includes a state noting the
detection of control panel log events (i.e. CP = (R1, R2)) and states showing Snort
detecting remote trip command network packets (i.e. SNT = (R1, R2)). The common
path for command injection includes the Snort alert but excludes the control panel log
state.
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(IR1 = Zero, IR2 =
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Time

Figure 5.8

2-D coordinates documenting ling maintenance versus command injection
attack common paths

Figure 5.7 and Figure 5.8 demonstrate that common paths contain the critical
states for different scenarios. The primary contribution of the mining common paths
algorithm is the ability to automatically create unique paths for each scenario type from
data sets which measure behavior associated with the scenarios.
5.4.4

Evaluation
Three approaches were used to evaluate the IDS. First, the IDS was used to

classify 5,000 instances of scenarios from the test data set described in section IV of this
chapter. Confusion matrices are provided to show IDS accuracy. A detailed review of the
algorithms ability to classify SLG faults by fault location is also provided. Second,
training and testing was repeated with sets of 4 scenarios missing from the data set. This
test was used to demonstrate the IDS’s ability to detect zero day attacks and unknown
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scenarios. Finally, IDS cost and performance was measured by measuring the amount of
processing time and memory required during training and evaluation.
Table 5.2
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q5
Q6
Q7
Q8
Q9
Q10
Q11
Q12
Q13
Oth.
Unk
Unc

Table 5.3
Q14
Q15
Q16
Q17
Q18
Q19
Q20
Q21
Q22
Q23
Q24
Q25
Oth
Unk
Unc

Confusion matrix for scenarios Q1-Q13
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 Q11 Q12 Q13
505
0 31
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 502
0 34
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
10
0 301
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
6
0 321
0
1
0
0
0
0
0 31
0
0
0
0
0 130
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 108
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 67
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 54
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 99
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 57
0
0
0
0
0
6
0
1
0
0
0
0
0 127
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 104
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 179
1
2
3
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
1
4
0
0
1 35 32
0 26
0
0
0
0
2
8
4
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Confusion matrix for scenarios Q14-Q25
Q14 Q15 Q16 Q17 Q18 Q19 Q20 Q21 Q22 Q23 Q24 Q25
220
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 208
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 162
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
40
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
73
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
33
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
45
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 424
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0 413
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 122
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 112
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 114
0
0
0
2
1
5
0
0
0
0
0
0
10
12
2
23
0
12
0
6
33
16
19
0
37
58
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
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Table 5.2 and Table 5.3 provide confusion matrices for the 25 tested scenarios.
The confusion matrices were separated into two tables to allow them to fit in the column
width of this chapter. The row labeled “Oth” represents scenarios Q14-Q25 in Table 1
and Q1-Q13 in Table 5.2. The row labeled “Unk” provides the number of instances
which were unclassified due to no matching common path. Finally, the row labeled
“Unc” provides the number of instances with uncertain classification due to matching
more than one common path from more than one scenario.
In total, 90.4% of the tested instances were correctly classified and 2.7% of the
instances were misclassified. 4.7% of instances were classified as unknown and 2.2%
were classified as uncertain. All of the cases of uncertain classification were related to
SLG fault instances which matched common path for more than one fault scenario.
Table 5.4

Confusion matrix for sub-groups in scenario Q1

10-23%
23-29%
30-35%
36-40%
41-60%
61-65%
65-70%
71-80%
81-90%
Unk. Fault
Unk

1023%
191
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
4

2329%
3
4
0
7
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

3035%
0
0
4
0
0
0
0
0
0
9
0

3640%
0
0
0
2
2
0
0
0
0
7
0

4160%
0
0
0
6
41
5
8
0
0
0
1

6164%
0
0
0
0
2
10
3
0
0
0
0

6570%
0
0
0
0
0
0
14
1
0
0
0

7180%
0
0
0
0
0
0
4
38
0
0
0

8190%
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
18
135
0
0

Table 5.4 displays a confusion matrix of classifications of the sub-groups for
scenario Q1 which is a SLG fault on line L1. As previously mentioned, the SLG fault
paths were grouped by fault location and system load. To save space the groups in the
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confusion matrix were combined to just show the fault location grouping. The row
labeled “Unk. Fault” indicates unknown faults, i.e. instances classified as more than one
fault. The row labeled “Unk” indicates unknown classification, i.e. instances which could
not be classified due to not matching a common path.
The overall accuracy rate for the groups shown in the Table 5.4 was 84.6%. The
majority of misclassification occurred when SLG fault groups were classified as
members of a neighboring or nearby fault group. The 16 cases of unknown faults all
occurred because both the (30-35%) and (36-40%) shared a common path. The intent of
the grouping of SLG faults was not to classify SLG faults by a specific fault location.
However, Table 5.4 demonstrates the mining common path algorithm’s strength of
finding unique paths for even similar scenarios.
Training and classification processing time and memory usage were measured
using an Ubuntu Linux Virtual Machine with 3.5GHZ CPU and 2GB memory. Training
required 0.33 seconds per scenario instance and 34 MB memory. Classification of test
cases required 0.85 seconds per scenario instance to complete and 26.2 MB of memory.
Tenfold cross-validation was used to evaluate the detection accuracy of zero-day
attack scenarios as shown in Table 5.4. For each round of testing four scenarios are
randomly selected to be excluded from training but present in the testing data set. The
average detection accuracy for zero-day attack scenarios was 73.43%. However, there are
cases where the detection rate for zero day attack is low. For example, in Round 3, the
zero day detection rate was 50.5%. Analysis of this case showed that scenario Q6
(command injection to trip relay R1 and R2) was always misclassified as scenario Q3
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(fault replay attack on Line L1). This is reasonable because the fault replay attack
includes injected trip commands targeting relays R1 and R2.
Table 5.5

5.5

Detection accuracy for 4 random zero-day attacks 10x validation

Round

Excluded Scenarios

Z.D. Acc. (%)

1

Q3, Q11, Q18, Q22

76.3

2

Q2, Q8, Q12, Q23

67.3

3

Q6, Q11, Q16, Q17

50.5

4

Q1, Q5, Q8, Q10

73.3

5

Q1, Q9, Q19, Q21

91.8

6

Q5, Q13, Q20, Q23

64.7

7

Q5, Q10, Q15, Q16

63.8

8

Q12, Q13, Q19, Q24

70.7

9

Q2, Q7, Q9, Q17

76.3

10

Q9, Q10, Q16, Q19

99.8

Conclusion
The IDS described in this chapter provides stateful monitoring of an electric

transmission distance protection system by leveraging a fusion of synchrophasor data and
information from relay, network security logs, and energy management system logs.
The IDS is trained using a mining common paths algorithm. Common paths are
hybrid signatures and specifications which described patterns of system behavior
associated with power system events. The algorithm provides a time-domain data
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analysis approach to overcome transients present in the measurements. This is done by
mining shared states out of a group of observed paths. Common paths are used to
describe system responses to power system disturbances, control actions, and cyberattacks.
The IDS matches monitored system state traversal to common paths to make
classification decisions. Classification is specific to each trained scenario rather than
simply an indication of normal or abnormal activity.
In this work the IDS was trained an evaluated for a 3-bus 2-line transmission
system which implements a 2 zone distance protection scheme. Twenty five scenarios
consisting of SLG faults, control actions, and cyber-attacks were implemented on a
hardware-in-the-loop test bed. Scenarios were run in a loop 10,000 times with
randomized system parameters to create a dataset for IDS training and evaluation. The
IDS correctly classified 90.4% of tested scenario instances. Evaluation also included a
tenfold cross-validation to evaluate the detection accuracy of zero-day attack scenarios.
The average detection accuracy for zero-day attack scenarios was 73.43%. The
performance of the proposed IDS has outscored that in [43] in average detection accuracy
and accuracy of zero-day attacks.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS

6.1

Conclusion
Synchrophasor systems are an emerging technology. Prior to installation of a

synchrophasor system a set of cyber security requirements must be developed, new
devices must undergo vulnerability testing, and proper security controls must be designed
to protect the synchrophasor system from unauthorized access.
In this dissertation we described the process used to develop a set of cyber
security requirements in the design stage of a synchrophasor project. A set of cyber
security rules was derived from review of the NISTIR 7628 Guidelines for Smart Grid
Cyber Security, DHS Security Procurement Language for Control Systems, and from
utility internal requirements. Next, the dissertation discussed a cybersecurity vulnerability
analysis and testing process. The testing process included network congestion and
protocol mutation testing of multiple phasor measurement units and phasor data
concentrators. The testing section provides limited results due to confidentiality
agreements and ethical reporting requirements. The testing section also discussed short
comings of the fuzzing tool used and described a network fuzzing framework that is
capable of fuzzing server to client interactions, client to server packet contents, and
system state. Next, the dissertation discussed the process of reviewing synchrophasor
system components against the drafted cyber security requirements. Each requirement
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was discussed in the context of the synchrophasor system and recommendations were
provided for meeting requirements. This dissertation also provides discussion on writing
SNORT intrusion detection rules based upon the results of cyber security testing.
While fixing the identified vulnerabilities in information infrastructure is
imperative to a secure power system, it is likely that successful intrusions will still occur.
The ability to detect intrusions is necessary to mitigate the negative effects from
successful attacks. This dissertation proposed a data mining algorithm called the mining
common path algorithm to learn patterns from data for different power system scenarios.
The mining common paths algorithm creates common paths which represent a set of
critical states that a system will step through in temporal order for a power system
scenario. The algorithm provides a time-domain data analysis approach to overcome
transients present in the measurements. This is done by mining shared states out of a
group of observed paths. The resulting classifier matches monitored system state traversal
to common paths to make classfication decisions. In effect, the mining common path
algorithm creates a set of temporal signatures for a system which describe scenarios.
This approach presented is applicable to many types of industrial control systems where
control algoorithms are well known and cyber attack impacts can be examined on a
system test bed.
Multiple case studies were performed to validate the mining common paths
algorithm and the IDS which used common paths created by the mining common paths
algorithm.
First, to demonstrate the ability of the mining common paths algorithm to learn
common paths from complex power system data, a case study was performed to
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demonstrate the ability to learn common paths for and distinguish SLG ground faults and
command injection attacks which remotely trip relays on a 3-bus 2-line transmission
system. The experiment applied the mining common paths algorithm to data with 2
classes; faults and command injection. This experiment demonstrated the ability of the
mining common paths algorithm to find common paths for both types of scenarios, power
system events and cyber-attacks. Furthermore, the experiment demonstrated the
precicions of the mining common paths algorithm by showing that faults grouped by
location and system load could be accurately distringuished from one another using
common paths created by the algorithm.
Second, an IDS prototype was built that employs common paths to detect power
system disturbances, control actions, and cyber-attacks on a larger scale. The IDS used
stateful monitoring of the electric transmission distance protection system by leveraging a
fusion of synchrophasor data and information from relay, network security logs, and
energy management system logs. The IDS matches monitored system state traversal to
common paths to make classification decisions. Classification was specific to each
trained scenario rather than simply an indication of normal or abnormal activity.
The IDS was trained an evaluated for a 3-bus 2-line transmission system which
implemented a 2 zone distance protection scheme. Twenty five scenarios consisting of
SLG faults, control actions, and cyber-attacks were implemented on a hardware-in-theloop test bed. Scenarios were run in a loop 10,000 times with randomized system
parameters to create a dataset for IDS training and evaluation. The IDS correctly
classified 90.4% of tested scenario instances. Evaluation also included a tenfold cross-
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validation to evaluate the detection accuracy of zero-day attack scenarios. The average
detection accuracy for zero-day attack scenarios was 73.43%.
Table 6.1 summarizes how the intrusion detection system proposed in this
dissertation fulfills the seven requirements introduced in Chapter I.
Table 6.1
Req. #

Fulfillment of seven requirements for the proposed IDS
Req. Description

How the proposed IDS meets requirements
This requirement is met by monitoring the
system according to a state machine in 2-D

1

The IDS should provide
stateful monitoring.

graph. The state machine contains a number of
common paths which represent the patterns of
power system scenarios and cyber-attacks.
Common paths are mined from data collected
across the system.

The IDS should be able to
detect power system
2

disturbances, normal
control operations and
cyber-attacks

25 scenarios were created for power system
disturbances, normal control operations and
cyber-attacks. The IDS creates a set of unique
common paths for each scenario and makes
classification according to these common
paths.
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Table 6.1 (Continued)
Req. #

Req. Description

How the proposed IDS meets requirements
Test cases that have patterns that do not match
any of the common paths trained in the IDS

3

The IDS should be able to
detect zero day attacks

are classified as zero day attacks. The
experiment in Section 5.5 showed that the
average detection rate for four unknown
scenarios is 73.43%. This is higher than what
was reported in [43].
This is done by a data formatting process
where a large amount of synchrophasor data
and logs are aggregated and processed into a
special form called path. A path is a compact

4

The IDS should be able to

representation of large volume of data as it

process large amount of

only consists of a sequence of system states.

data

The mining common paths algorithm is further
used to shrink the larger group of paths into a
representative set of common paths which
represent normal variation and serve as a set of
signatures for each scenario.
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Table 6.1 (Continued)
Req. #

Req. Description

How the proposed IDS meets requirements
The IDS construction process from data
formatting to generating common paths can be
automated by software. Although expert

5

The Development of IDS

knowledge is still needed for feature

should have low cost.

quantization and may be used for path
grouping, this is huge progress with
comparison to [27] where rules are created
manually using expertise.
Results show the IDS can detect changes in
configuration which result from operators
taking a line out of service or a relay operating

The IDS should be able to
withstand continuous
6

changes to system
configuration and load
level changes.

after detecting a fault by learning these
patterns from collected data. New changes in
configuration will result in new scenarios.
Since the IDS learns patterns from data, new
scenarios will be simulated in the test bed and
relevant data will be collected to train the IDS.
The IDS overcomes changes in load level by
grouping paths according to load level ranges
before the common paths learning process.
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Table 6.1 (Continued)
Req. #

Req. Description

How the proposed IDS meets requirements
The evaluation results in Section 5.5 has

The IDS should have high
7

detection accuracy and a
low false positive rate.

shown that for classifying 25 scenarios 90.4%
of the tested instances were correctly classified
and 2.7% of the instances were misclassified.
4.7% of instances were classified as unknown
and 2.2% were classified as uncertain.

6.2

Future Works
This dissertation enables multiple possible future. First, the vulnerability

assessment process presented in this work can be applied to other emerging cyberphysical systems such as advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) and other industrial
control systems. As to different cyber-physical systems, different sets of penetration tests
can be developed based on the unique structure of the target system and the control and
protection algorithms available in the system in order to study the attack consequences on
corresponding systems. The fuzzing framework proposed in this work can also be
extended to test other industrial protocols such as MODBUS and ANS C12.22 for AMI.
While penetration testing is a practical method to assess a target system’s security
features, the other method of performing vulnerability assessment is through theoretical
methodologies such as Bayesian network and attack tree formulation. The theoretical
method can be applied to cyber-physical systems to derive quantitative vulnerability
measures in order to determine how likely a vulnerability can be exploited.
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Second, we have shown that the proposed IDS works for a 3-bus and 2-line
transmission system implemented distance protection scheme. However, a realistic power
system usually contains thousands of buses and transmission lines. Training the IDS for
such a large system will raise other questions, for example, is data from all transmission
line required for training? Are all features needed? While PMU are not available for each
transmission line, what will be the optimal locations to place PMU in order to collect the
data needed for training the IDS?
Third, an immediate next step for the IDS will be to implement the IDS in realtime. This requires the IDS to be able to process a continuous stream of synchrophasor
data. In this dissertation, for proof of concept the proposed IDS is trained and tested with
off-line data. To achieve real-time implementation, two methods can be used. In the first
method, the synchrophasor data stream can be first buffered in a historian. Then the
common paths of different scenarios can be learned from historian data off-line using
mining common paths algorithm but the detection can be implemented in real time to
match the system states to the common paths. The second method is to implement the
learning process in real-time as well. In this case, the continuous data stream may be
windowed to learn paths. The mining common path algorithm might need to be updated
so that the known patterns can be refined based on the new path learned from the coming
data in a window. The potential problems associated with this method are related to the
definition of the size for a window and the start of the window. The start of the window
determines the start state of a path. In this dissertation, a path starts from the system
normal state. But in a more complex environment where the occurrence of scenarios
might overlap, the start of a window may not be easily found. Also, other data mining
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methods such as stream data mining may be worth investigating to learn patterns from a
continuous data stream for the purpose of intrusion detection.
Forth, the future plan for intrusion detection will include using pattern recognition
techniques to detect anomalies [76][77][78][79]. In addition, the causal event graph
theory can be used to develop the intrusion detection for power system .
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